Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 15, 2026

Michael Roberts: China’s slowdown

China's Slowdown

by Michael Roberts

China’s second quarter GDP growth saw a significant deceleration, down to 4.3% year over year from 5.0% in the first quarter and weaker than forecast. This was the slowest growth in any quarter since the pandemic lockdown hit in 2022. But, even with this Q2 slowdown, China’s real GDP growth for the first half of 2026 remains within the government’s target range at 4.7% YoY.

Nevertheless, Western ‘experts’ continue to argue that this slowdown confirms their view that China is heading down towards stagnation. Take the points raised by Richi Sharma in the FT, made before this latest growth figure.  “Though many forecasters keep expecting China to surpass the US as the world’s leading economy, its growth peaked in 2021. Since then, China’s share of global GDP has fallen in nominal terms from 18 to 16.5 per cent, while the US share has risen to 26 per cent. China’s growth rate has dropped below the rest of the world, including the US. In real terms, independent estimates now put China’s growth in real terms closer to zero than to the official target of 4.5 to 5 per cent.”

Let me answer these points one by one.  First, China’s real GDP growth rate may have peaked in 2014, but the gap between China’s average growth rate since then and that of G7 economies has not disappeared.  On average since 2014, China’s growth rate has been over 4% points higher than the average growth rate in the G7.

Yes, China’s share of global GDP has declined in nominal terms, but that is not the case in real terms.  So Sharma is being disengenuous here.  The contraction in nominal terms is primarily caused by a weakening Chinese yuan against a very strong US dollar and domestic deflation. Because nominal GDP is calculated in current US dollars, exchange rate and price shifts artificially compress the size of China’s economy on the global stage.  In real terms, using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), we can eliminate the effect of currency exchange fluctuations. Then, instead of a fall in China’s share of world GDP of 1.5-2.0% points, in real terms  there has been a rise of 1.4% points.

Historical Trend Data (2021–2026)

YearNominal Share of Global GDPReal (PPP) Share of Global GDP
202118.74% (Peak)18.5%
202218.09%18.7%
202317.28%18.99%
202417.00%19.31%
202516.70%19.63%
2026 (Current)16.50%19.89%

Sources: Compiled from tracking by the IMF DataMapperStatista, and TheGlobalEconomy.

Also China’s growth rate has not “dropped below the rest of the world” as Sharma claims.  Here he falls back on “independent estimates now put China’s growth in real terms closer to zero than to the official target of 4.5 to 5 per cent.”  What are these ‘independent’ estimates?  They come from one particular source, the Rhodium Group, a Western research unit that claims to be China ‘experts’. The Rhodium Group does away with the official GDP estimates, arguing that they are biased upwards and do not take into account weak domestic economic activity.  

Rhodium claims to estimate China’s growth from the bottom up by disaggregating expenditures (not production) in sectors. Their ‘disaggregation’ method basically boils down to reducing official fixed asset investment figures by a significant multiple to the level of investment expenditure on the property sector.  And the property sector, as is well known, has been in a serious slump for some time.  In effect, Rhodium reduces China’s investment growth rate (which overall is falling 5.7% yoy) to the real estate investment growth rate, which is falling at 18% yoy, dragging down the overall rate.  If you use property investment as the measure of China’s investment rate, no wonder you reach zero for overall growth.  

Rhodium estimates China’s growth rate just from ‘demand’ data, like retail sales, credit growth and ‘consumer confidence’.  It ignores ‘supply’ indicators like industrial production, exports and manufacturing in general.  But most Western estimates of China’s GDP do not go down the Rhodium road.  The Bank of Finland, for example, also does not accept the official figures, and instead tracks production metrics like electricity generation, rail freight and net exports.  It finds China’s real GDP growth is about 1% point below the official data, but that still means it’s around 4% a year.

Indeed, China’s industrial production rose 5.4% in the fist half of 2026, with manufacturing up 6% and the tech sector up 14%.

Looking at China’s industry, it’s clear that external demand is the key factor behind the rise, with rail, ships, and aerospace up 18.2%, autos up 8.7%, and computers, communications, and electronic equipment up 15.7%,. Semiconductor production hit a 17-month high of 25.4% yoy amid the continued tech boom.

This is not to dismiss the current slowdown in overall investment growth.  Fixed asset investment dropped 5.7% yoy over the first half of the year and marked the lowest level since May 2020.  Private sector investment fell 8.5% and state-owned investment also fell further, down to 2.3%. Both private and state-owned enterprises appear to be postponing capital expenditure plans, adding to an already weak investment environment.

What is behind this?  The culprit is the continued slump in the property sector and difficulties for local governments in dealing with the buildup in debt that spiralled during the property boom. These are the drivers of the relatively weak domestic demand.

Property prices are still falling, if now at a much slower pace, with even some cities now experinencing a small rise.  But even excluding the property sector, fixed-asset investment was still down by 2.7% in the six months to June, slipping further from a 1.2% fall in the first five months of the year. 

The other factor depressing domestic demand is the overhang of debt left by the property bust, which is now mainly concentrated in local governments.  Loans made by local governments to private developers during the property bubble remain on the books and so many are paralysed in doing any further investments as a result.  While central government and the state banks are expanding investment and credit into ‘new productive forces’ ie. the tech and solar sectors , local governments cannot follow.

So a big reason why China’s overall investment has dropped is the leftover of the property and local government financing spree.  China’s Communist leaders made a big mistake.  They allowed the urbanisation of China and the rise of its cities and the homes in them to be put into the hands of the private sector. They did not institute a state run and controlled national housing development program and instead got local governments to finance private property developers.

Thus the Chinese government allowed a massive expansion of unproductive and speculative investment by the capitalist sector of the economy.  In the drive to build enough houses and infrastructure for the sharply rising urban population, central and local governments left the job to private developers.  Instead of building houses for rent, they opted for the ‘free market’ solution of private developers building for sale.  Of course, homes needed to be built, but as President Xi put it belatedly, “homes are for living in, not for speculation.” 

As a result, the bulk of China’s ‘zombie companies’ are property developers, still acting as a drag on overall growth and investment domestically. Local governments have been left to absorb a lot of these bad debts from local banks and property developers — while they’ve been saddled with restrictive debt issuance limits, and Beijing is still signalling limited support.

China’s economic expansion is still on, but it is heavily dependent on export trade.  Despite Trump’s tariffs and other sanctions (which are added to each day!), China’s exports to the rest of the world have reached record levels. China’s exports surged 27% year-on-year to a historic, record high of $412 billion in June 2026. This growth propelled China’s total export value for the first half of 2026 to $2.12 trillion (a 17.6% year-on-year increase.  This boom was heavily accelerated by two primary catalysts: the global artificial intelligence infrastructure rush and a massive scaling of green technology shipments.

I won’t go into the relentless arguments presented by the Western ‘experts’ that China is causing ‘global imbalances’ from its export success and shifting ‘overcapacity’ through dumping goods at very cheap prices on world markets.  I have dealt with these arguments in previous posts. But there is a new attack. It is the claim that China’s huge rising share of global exports is ‘crowding out’ other Global South exporting economies.  This is a particularly ludicrous argument.  Western ‘experts’ never worried about China’s export success two decades ago when they thought it was based on US and European companies based in China.  But now that China has developed its own industrial firms and leads the way in key export sectors, these experts claim it is damaging ‘poor’ countries. 

Vietnam lends the lie to that.  It is an economy that has a similar model to China ie state-led and state-owned sector, alongside a capitalist sector.  Vietnam’s share of global exports has risen significantly over the last ten years, increasing from approximately 1.2% a decade ago to around 1.35% now. 

China is not ‘crowding out’ Vietnam.The failure of other countries to build export market share is more down to most Global South economies being dominated by foreign multinationals and having no significant state sector or independent plan.  Imperialism has made it impossible for the Global South to ‘catch up’, not China.

China is not expanding domestically fast enough, even though real consumer spending has averaged over 6% a year since 2014 – hardly a snail’s pace as in the G7.  However, it seems likely that the property bust is bottoming and local governments are beginning to deal with their debt overhang.  And investment in new tech sectors is rocketing.  So there is every reason to expect China to meet its current growth target of 4.5-5.0% this year.

Saturday, June 13, 2026

Michael Roberts: A Marxist Theory of Crisis in the Contemporary World

As a worker and long time union activist, I want to encourage working class people who are seeking answers to the many issues we are facing in our daily lives, to read Michael Roberts' answers to important questions in this interview. I think that workers often retreat from a subject when we feel we don't fully understand it or it appear's too complex; a result of class oppression in my view. I know I did. But one doesn't have to understand every detail, every aspect of a subject to recognise that its main premise is fundamentally sound. One doesn't have to be an "angler" to catch fish. If we understood everything about a subject the moment we opened the page there'd be no need to read on. It's like taking up hiking; we don't start with a trek up Kilimanjaro. 

Michael Roberts, a Marxist economist I have know for a long time, touches on some important subjects that are important to all workers. The issue of China for example and economic questions like finance capital, investment, crypto currency or what causes recessions or slumps. I think it is important to develop some understanding of China's incredible rise and how this has occurred.

I am not an expert in economic theory, Marxist or otherwise,  and there is a need for "experts" in any subject if we want to fully understand them. We never stop learning in a way. But I do grasp the general process that is at the heart of Marx's explanation of the capitalist system of production that Michael touches on here and, and that enables me to see things more clearly. It's an explanation that corresponds with objective reality, my life as a worker, a seller of labor power not a buyer of it. There is powerful propaganda in society that denies class oppression or that workers are exploited at all. Roberts says of the tech worker, "knowledge workers are just as much part of the proletariat as manual workers doing physical tasks." They are learning that truth at a rapid pace. The workplace is the best teacher. Read on, and if you hit an obstacle, put it aside, you can return to it later. Learning is a process. Richard Mellor

A Marxist Theory of Crisis in the Contemporary World

This is an English translation of an interview published in Chinese by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2025 in World Socialist Research.

1. Michael Roberts, thank you for your time! Could you briefly tell us when you got to know and accept Marxism and what impact did your previous job in the City of London have?

If you have a Marxist insight into the workings of finance capital, you are much less likely to assume that all will be well with financial investment. One lesson for workers that I learnt and this applies to China too: stay out of financial markets. Even better, workers’ pension funds should not rely on stock market investing as these funds continually lose workers’ contributions by doing so. But it works the other way too. A close understanding of the workings of the financial beast can help us explain better the fragilities and speculations of the system.   

2. What do you think is the core idea of Marxism? What’s the relationship between historical materialism and the critique of political economy? 

The core ideas of Marxism can be reduced to two key concepts. 

First, the history of human organisation since primitive times is the history of class struggle. The materialist conception of history is that change for better or worse is driven by the material interests of classes and, in particular, by the ruling class (feudal lords, capitalist companies) and the working class. While individuals can play key roles at moments in history (decisions and actions by kings or by revolutionary leaders), in the final analysis, change depends on economics and classes. As Marx said: “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” 

The second core idea is the law of value under capitalism. Capitalism is a system of production for the profit of the owners of the means of production, who exploit those who own nothing but their ability to work for the owners. Labour creates all the things and services that we use and need, but the value of that labour is appropriated by the owners of the means of production as ‘surplus value’ over and above what labour receives for its work. That surplus value is accumulated as capital. Our social needs then depend on the decisions of capitalists on whether it is profitable or not. This explanation of the workings of the modern economy is denied by the apologists for capitalism – but it is compellingly clear. 

3. The theory of crisis is an important part of Marx’s critique of political economy. There have been many debates among Marxists on how to understand Marx’s theory of crisis. What do you think of Marx’s theory of crisis, and the relationship between overproduction, underconsumption, and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall? 

Yes, a theory of crises under capitalism is very important. The apologists for capitalism deny that there are any endemic crises in capitalist production – ie regular and recurring slumps in production, investment and employment. For them, such crises are either random events, one-offs or the result of bad decisions, speculations or negligence. The apologists deny that crises are inherent in the capitalist system of production for profit. But Marx’s law of value reveals why regular crises are endemic. Capitalist production only takes place if profits are made and Marx shows that a contradiction arises between the drive for more production and profitability of that production (ie profits relative to capital invested). Capitalists compete against each other to gain market share and a bigger cut in the profits appropriated from workers. In order to gain an advantage, they resort to using labour-saving technology to reduce costs and increase the productivity of labour. But Marx argued that profit only comes from labour going to work, so if investment is increasingly in machines etc relative to labour, productivity may rise but at the expense of a tendency for profitability to fall. Eventually, profitability may fall so much that it causes a fall in total profits. Then capitalists stop investing, close down production and lay off workers. Unemployment rises alongside unsold goods and services. This is a slump. It can only be rectified by getting profitability rising again and that requires removing unnecessary workers, weak companies and keeping wages down. Then the whole process can start again. Slumps are a necessary ‘cleansing’ process for capital to recover. Marx outlines his theory of crises most clearly in Capital Volume 3, Chapters 13-15. 

However, many Marxists do not accept that the law of tendency of the rate of profit to fall as explained in these chapters is relevant to crises in capitalism. Instead they consider two other main theories. The first is that there is ‘underconsumption’. This is when workers cannot buy back all the goods and services produced by the capitalists because they do not have enough money. Both Marx and Engels disputed this underconsumption theory, pointing out that workers will never have enough money to buy back all the output being sold, precisely because wages do not contain all the value created and realised as the capitalists have appropriated any surplus value (the difference between the value of commodities sold and wages going to the workers; in other words, profits). The point is that capitalists do not need to sell all their commodities to workers; much of sales is to other capitalists (eg steel is sold to auto manufacturers to make cars etc). 

The other alternative theory is that of ‘overproduction’. Capitalists just keep producing to accumulate more profits without considering whether they can sell their production on the market. They overproduce relative to demand. The problem with this explanation of crises is that it does not explain when production becomes ‘too much production’. It may never happen, or it could happen at any moment. There is no logic to this theory. Put it this way, if supply is in line with demand, can there still be a crisis of investment and production in capitalism? Marx would say yes, because the profitability of what is being produced is what decides whether capitalists invest or not. Indeed, this is how crises unfold. Profitability falls, then total profits and then capitalists try to sell more to cover falling profits. But that means ‘overproduction’, forcing capitalists to lower prices and/or cut production. Overproduction is the result of the overaccumulation of capital ie falling profitablity of capital invested, not the other way round.

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4. In 2020, you published the book Engels 200 – His Contribution to Political Economy, in which you systematically introduced Engels’ research on political economy and his contribution to Marxist political economy. However, there is a view that the crisis caused by the rate of profit to fall is actually Engels’ viewpoint, and he exaggerated or even tampered with Marx’s discussion on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall when editing volume 3 of Capital. What do you think of this viewpoint?

This view has been expressed by several Marxists (in particular, the German Marxist scholar, Michael Heinrich) who claim that they have read unpublished papers by Marx that apparently show Engels changing Marx’s words to make the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall appear more important. These Marxists also claim that Marx actually abandoned the law in the 1870s and so it should not be considered relevant to Marxist economics and crisis theory.

But other scholars have shown clearly that Engels did not engage in any significant distortion of Marx’s text as in Chapters 13-15 of Volume 3 where the law of profitability is spelt out. And there is no evidence that Marx dropped the law in the 1870s – on the contrary, he conducts further work on it. For example, in the 1870s, Marx spent considerable time looking at the rate of profit with various mathematical formulas. When Engels came to edit Capital Volume 3, he excluded Marx’s mathematical work on the rate of profit, even though it would have confirmed that Marx still held to his law. All this is explained in my book, Marx 200 and in my book Engels 200, with all the references.

The Marxists who push this have also bent Marx’s law of value into a theory of money ie. value is not created by labour in production, but instead is only realised in selling commodities produced on the market. So no sale, then no value. This was not Marx’s view. Value is the result of the effort of human labour in production; how much of that value is eventually realised depends on sale in the market. But there is no value at all without human labour production. Behind this revised theory is an attempt to replace profitability as the ultimate cause of crises with a theory of monetary or credit instability, similar to the view of mainstream economists like Keynes.

5. From your point of view, what are the main differences between Marxist political economy and other schools of economics (like neoclassical economics, Keynesianism, etc.)? Can we regard the theory of crisis as an important difference or even essential difference between Marxist political economy and mainstream Western economics?

The key difference above all is that other schools of economics, even the most radical ‘heterodox’ schools that do not accept that markets are perfect, do not agree with Marx’s law of value. They do not accept that the key contradiction of capitalist production is production for profit, not social need and that increased production eventually comes into conflct with increased profitability and that is what leads to booms and slumps, ie crises. The mainstream neoclassical school deny crises can happen in properly run markets or in markets that are not interfered with by governments, monopolies or trade unions. Heterodox economists deny the role of profit in crises and look to either a ‘lack of demand’ (Keynes); or financial instability (Minsky) or monopolies (Sweezy, Stiglitz) or bad regulation.

And this is a crucial difference, because all these schools are suggesting that capitalist production can be modified or corrected to make capitalism work better. Keynes said more government spending or monetary injections will do the trick; heterodox Minsky said: regulate the banks and finaancial institutions, then capitalism will be stable. These reformist approaches are theoretally and empirically wrong. Marx’s theory of crisis shows that capitalism cannot be reformed in that way. Crises are endemic to capitalism because ultimately they are caused by falling profitability. The only way to end crises is to replace capitalism with a planned economy under common ownership ie no capitalists. 

6. In your research, what impacts does the financialization of capitalism have on the real economy and the working class? 

One of the features of the last 50 years in modern economies in the Global North has been the rise of the financial sectors, not just banks but hedge funds, investment funds, insurance funds, private equity, cryptocurrencies etc. Increasingly, capitalists have switched their investment of accrued profits into financial assets and speculation rather than into investment into new technology and productive sectors. This is the phenomenon of ‘financialisation’. 

However, some Marxists and others have been so enamoured by this development that they have started to claim that capitalism has changed its spots. It is no longer a system of production for profit through the exploitation of labour in factories, offices etc, but now it is just a financial monetary system where money makes more money. This means that workers have lost their role as producers of value in capitalism. Now capitalists can get value just from monetary tricks. Capitalism has become finance capital, which rules over producer capital.

This is nonsense. Although financial profits in some economies like the US and the UK are large, say up to 25% of total profits, the vast majority of profits are still made by selling goods and services produced by workers. And that is especially the case in the so-called Global South where manufacturing has become predominant, not finance. Globally, the working class has never been larger and still most capitalist accumulation comes from the labour of working people in production. The leopard of capitalism has not changed its spots.

7. What do you think of the current crisis of capitalism in the global economic system, especially the financial crisis in recent years? What insights can Marxist political economy provide for us to understand the crisis of capitalism

This is a big subject. In the 21st century we have had the two biggest slumps in the history of capitalism, 2008-9 and 2020. There is every reason to expect that another slump will take place before the end of this decade. That may be triggered by a new financial crash as in 2008. This time that crash may not start in the banks as such but be engendered by rising corporate debt and the cost of servicing that debt. Already, there are around 20% of companies in Europe, Japan and the US that are called ‘zombies’ ie they are like the living dead because they do not make enough profits to cover even the cost of servicing their existing debt and so must keep borrowing.These companies are in serious risk of going bust and bringing down even profitable companies in a ricochet effect. 

8. You think that since the end of the Great Recession in 2009, the major capitalist economies have been in a Long Depression. Is there any difference between the Long Depression and previous long depressions in the history of capitalism? What strategies should China adopt in response to the global impact of the Long Depression?

I define a depression as opposed to a recession or slump as a period where after a slump, the previous trend of growth in output, investment and above all profitability, is much lower than before the slump. And this lower trend can last for decades. In that sense, the Long Depression of the 2010s onwards that I have identified is similar to the depression of the late 19th century (1873-97) and the Great Depression of 1929-42. As of 2025, the current depression is continuing as the pandemic slump of 2020 did not lead to a significant rise in profitability and so investment growth and real GDP growth remain even weaker than in the 2010s. 

China has avoided all these crises in capitalism. That’s because China has an economy dominated by a large state sector and planning by the government, so that any instability in its capitalist sector can be overcome and investment and production can carry on relatively uninterrupted. If the capitalist economies of the West head into another slump, then trade and investment into China will be hit, but China now has a massive domestic base and it has invested heavily into new technologies and continues to direct and plan that investment mainly through the state sector. China needs to expand the state sector and planning to reduce the instability in its capitalist sector, particularly exposed by its plunging real estate sector (mostly capitalist based).

9. Digital currency and blockchain technology have been hot topics in the field of financial technology in recent years, and they have had a profound impact on the global economy and financial system. What is your opinion of these financial innovations and digital finance?Will they lead to a more serious global economic crisis? 

Cryptocurrencies, as they are called, like bitcoin, are just another form of speculative financial asset like gold or paintings. They are not alternative forms of money that could replace state issued currencies (fiat money) like the dollar or yuan. Digital currencies in general already exist in one form ie you pay your bills by card, phone or bank transfer without any paper money involved. The possible new development would be a central bank digital currency that bypasses commercial banks. So far, that development has made limited progress. In the meantime, cryptocurrencies are yet another form of what Marx called ‘fictitious capital’ that adds yet more risk of a financial crash down the road. 

10. Given the increasing popularity of artificial intelligence and automation, how to apply Marxism to analyze the impact of technological progress on production modes and social relations?In your research, what is the correlation between technological progress and economic growth?

This is complicated. Artificial intelligence (AI) is just a new form of technology aimed at replacing human labour and increasing the productivity of labour and so raising the rate of exploitation on labour by capital. New technology can lead to huge job losses, especially for those in industries and occupations it replaces, but it can also, over time, create new industries and employment. Consider the industrial revolution, the electricity revolution, the auto industry, computer revolution. Technology has always been key to economic growth by raising the productivity of labour, especially when the size of the labour force stops rising – as in China today. 

It is argued that AI is a completely new development that will replace human labour altogether because it can supersede human intelligence. The evidence for this is doubtful. Much of AI is just a fast processing of existing human knowledge and cannot replace the imaginative nature of human intelligence. Also, AI will take some time, even decades, to diffuse its productivity-enhancing effects through economies. In my view, it is not a ‘game changer’ that can save capitalism. 

11. Technofeudalism is a view that has emerged in recent years to describe the changes of society caused by cloud technology, that is, tech giants and large platform enterprises possess the data and power like feudal lords, while ordinary users serve these digital overlords as unpaid data producers like serfs, and the new form of rent replaces profit as the main form of accumulation. Do you agree with using technofeudalism to define the current stage of western society? 

Technofeudalism as a concept suggests that capitalist production, ie production for a profit through the exploitation of labour, has been replaced by a feudalism where digital monopolies just extract rents. But where do these rents come from? Marx pointed out that rent, interest and profits all come from the same source: the surplus value appropriated from the value created by human labour power. It is just wrong to argue that companies selling cloud technology are not producing commodities for sale and profit just like any capitalist process. The bulk of Amazon’s profits come from distribution and transport of things; the bulk of Facebook’s profits come from advertising; the bulk of Google’s too. The bulk of Microsoft and Apple profits are from selling computer hardware and software. This is not feudalism but straightforward capitalism. Capitalism is not dead and to suggest that it is a dangerous idea for workers because it means labour may not see its enemy as capital as a whole, but just a small part of capital, so that there is no need to replace capitalism but just ‘feudal monopoly’ capitalism.

12. The labor theory of value is the core idea of Marxist economics. In time of automation and the digital economy, how to apply the labor theory of value to analyze modern economy? What do you think of data as a new factor of production? 

Data or knowledge comes from human activity. So knowledge has value in the same way that physical things have value for society and for capital. Knowledge is material: it requires the energy of human labour; ie. mental labour, in the same way as physical labour. Both are material and create value. So capital can appropriate surplus value from knowledge workers that it employs and does so increasingly across industries and the world. Such surplus value is embodied in patents, intellectual property rights etc. Knowledge or mental labour is just as ‘material’ as physical labour. Mental activity takes place in the synapses of the human brain and is combined with physical labour using a computer etc. So mental labour creates value just as much as physical labour. And knowledge workers are just as much part of the proletariat as manual workers doing physical tasks.

Indeed, mental labourers are being exploited increasingly by capital to appropriate surplus value (profit) .So there is no need to invent a new term for the working class such as a ‘multitude’. This implies that the working class, those who only make a living by selling their labour power and own no means of production, no longer exist. This term hides the class struggle between labour and capital, thus confusing the need to replace capitalism. 

13. Has the development of the digital capitalism widened the North-South divide

Yes, it is widening that divide. But that divide is widening anyway. The Global South (with the exception of China) is not catching up with the Global North however you measure it: by GDP per person; by productivity per worker; by income per person; by reducing inequality. The North-South divide is expressed in the control of an imperialist bloc of economies with relatively low population dominating the rest of the world which has the bulk of humanity.

14. What economic policies do you think president Donald Trump will adopt, and what impacts will these policies have on the global economy? 

We cannot be sure what Trump will do. But he says he is going to apply huge tariffs on US imports, particularly those coming from China. He claims his aim is to get US industry back to where it was at the expense of the rest of the world. Above all, he wants to continue the policy of previous US administrations to strangle, choke and reverse the economic progress of China, which is seen as the main threat to US hegemony. Indeed, Trump will also back further military provocations to restrict China. Domestically, he aims to cut corporate taxation so the rich and big business pay even less than now and do away with regulations on industry and global warming abatement. His Cabinet is composed completely of billionaire hedge fund and private equity managers who will seek to benefit the rich at the expense of most Americans. 

Worldwide, if Trump does follow through with these policies, then world trade will fall back and tensions between the US-led Western alliance and China will rise dangerously. Inequality of wealth and income between countries and within countries will increase and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East will continue, with the risk of war in Asia too.

15. Will Trump’s promised economic policies, such as massive tax cuts and increased military spending, pose a threat to global economic stability by leading to higher global debt levels?

Yes, global debt is already at record highs and relative to global output. In particular, the US government is running sizeable budget deficits in order to finance the war in Ukraine and for Israel and it plans massive increases in military spending to fund further action globally. Trump wants Europe to pay more for this, but in the meantime, US public debt is hitting all-time highs and the cost of servicing that debt in interest is now surpassing government spending on education and health and other public services. 

16. Will Trump’s economic policies worsen the contradictions of the global capitalist system, leading to overproduction and the tendency of crisis?

All this is against a global background of low growth and trade, poor investment and productivity growth. The major capitalist economies, with the possible exception of the US, are stagnating or even in outright recession, especially in Europe. There is every possibility that these economies will face a serious slump by the end of this decade, which will spill over to the rest of the world, as happened in 2008 and 2020. Only China can hope to ride through that. 

17. Do Trump’s economic policies reflect the rise of economic nationalism and protectionism in the context of globalization? Will these policies worsen global economic inequality? How can developing countries respond to the inequality in the global economic system? 

Protectionism and nationalism by others is no alternative solution to Trump. Developing countries need to come together to cooperate on trade, investment and reducing inequality. But to do that, the people in these countries must get governments that stand for labour and for common ownership of resources and assets to plan each economy and in cooperation globally. Unfortunately, nearly all Global South governments do not stand for these policies. They are either controlled by despots or support big business at home and US imperialism abroad. Until these governments are changed, I do not expect much progress in higher growth, reduced inequalities, full employment and better public services.

18. You persist in writing blogs for a long time. What influence has this style of writing made on your thinking and exchange of ideas? Could you share your recent research or research plan in the future?

The aim of the blog and my books is to increase our understanding of how capitalism works, its contradictions and faultlines, with a view to replace it. I consider that Marx’s analysis of capitalism is the most compelling and so I seek to defend Marx’s views, as I see them, against alternatives, all of which come down to trying to make capitalism work (better). I aim my blog not at academics but at activists seeking to change the world for the better. That does not mean I ignore difficult or complex issues of theory or statistical evidence. On the contrary, I try to explain them more clearly. Currently, I am preparing a new book on what is happening in capitalism and in the world economy in the 2020s. It is really a follow up to my Long Depression book published in 2016. Many things have happened since and there is more to come in this decade.

Time is Running Out’ will be published in December 2026 by Haymarket Books. 

Tuesday, May 19, 2026

Michael Roberts: The Thucydides trap and the decline of US imperialism

The Thucydides trap and the decline of US imperialism

by Michael Roberts

On the first day of talks during US President Donald Trump’s recent state visit to China, his host China’s Xi Jinping invoked the so-called “Thucydides trap” to warn against any war beween the two superpowers that now dominate the world economic and political landscape.

Xi was referring to the fifth-century BC Greek historian Thucydides who (it is claimed) argued that the threat posed by the then rising power of the Athens maritime city state so frightened the longstanding land-based hegemonic power, Sparta, that the latter went to war to crush Athens.  Xi warned that if the US had any such ambitions with China, it would be a trap for the US.

The concept of the Thucydides Trap  was first developed by Herman Wouk, the novelist and WW2 veteran in 1980. Wouk then compared the U.S.-Soviet cold war to the “cold war” that developed between Athens and Sparta once they had defeated Persia, their common enemy in the middle of 5th century BC.  In 2015, American political scientist Graham Allison took up the lessons of the Peloponnesian (a mainland Greek peninsular) war between Athens and Sparta as an analogy for the rising conflict between the US and China.  Allison claimed that, among a sample of 16 historical instances of an emerging power rivalling a ruling power, 12 had ended in war.  He cited the First World War, where the rising European power, Germany, went to war against the declining hegemonic powers of Britain and France. Then there was the rising economic power of Japan in WW2 that launched an attack on the US in 1940.  Allison reckoned that Thucydides showed that when a rising power (such as Athens) challenges the status of a ruling power (such as Sparta), war would be difficult to avoid.  This was the ‘trap’ that the US should avoid, said Xi, not surprisingly. Ironically, in the Peloponnesian war it was the emergent power (Athens) that lost and the dominant power that won (Sparta) and it was the same for the world wars of 20th century.  So the Thucydides Trap is not really a good analogy for Xi to use. 

But anyway, is the Thucydides Trap of ancient Greece relevant to the increased rivalry between the US and China in the 21st century?  The examples that Allison cites are hardly convincing.  For example, the US was no declining power in the 1930s – on the contrary.  And WW1 kicked off because a much weaker power, Austria-Hungary, launched an attack on the Balkan states that brought Russia into the conflict and which then spiralled to involve the world.

Moreover, the core lesson of the Peloponnesian war, according to Thucydides himself, was not the inevitability of war between rival powers, but the decisions made by the ruling elites in the two states. In the case of Athens, its rising economic strength led to hubris on the part of Athens’ leaders. They thought they could invade Sicily, which was supported by Sparta at the time, and so gain huge new prosperous lands.  But Athens was heavily defeated in their invasion, which weakened it so much that eventually Sparta triumphed.  US historians and military strategists naturally like to raise this angle on the Thucydides Trap to argue that if China decides to invade Taiwan it will suffer the same fate as Athens did in Sicily.  They are happy to conclude that it was the ‘declining’ power, Sparta, that eventually crushed the ‘rising power, Athens.  So the US will win its battle for hegemony if China attempts to occupy Taiwan.

But China is not so foolhardy. Yes, Taiwan is seen as part of China and must be returned to the mainland, but Taiwan is not 5th century BC Sicily.  The US cannot really defend the Taiwanese statelet from China short of outright war, which it is probably not capable of sustaining, unlike Sparta could with Sicily.  Moreover, in the 21st century, the rival powers have nuclear weapons of mass destruction that pose the possibility of annihilation for both (and the rest of us) in any war. Behind Xi’s comment is that China seeks to play the waiting game. His warning about the ‘trap’ is to push back against any ideas that the US may have about military conflict with China over Taiwan.  

In my view, the T-trap analogy is not very applicable to the 21st century global power struggle.  A better analogy is not the Peloponnesian Wars, but the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage some 200 years later.  By 250 BC, the Roman Republic had come to dominate most parts of the Mediterranean through military prowess and a developing slave economy. But there was one major rival power that stood in the way of Rome’s total domination, the north African city state of Carthage.  Carthage controlled Sicily just as Sparta had done. Rome launched an invasion of Sicily, which it eventually captured from the Carthaginians after 25 years of conflict.  Carthage was not finished, however, and it took a series of wars (including the famous invasion of Rome by Carthage’s military leader Hannibal) before Rome was able to defeat its rival and completely destroy the city and its people. Rome then became the sole hegemonic power in the Med and it expanded its empire further through military conquest that provided millions of slaves for its domestic economy. But this did not last. Rome’s slave supply dried up and the Roman state eventually lost any form of civic democracy and slipped into a corrupt military dictatorship under a succession of (sometimes insane) emperors. 

This analogy fits better to the rise of the US as the dominant power in the 20th century faced with only one rival, the Soviet Uinion.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the US achieved complete dominance, as Rome did in 200 BC.  But as in Rome then, the internal economic contradictions within the US capitalist economy have now begun to eat into its power from within. The ‘globalists’ at the head of the US state machine are still trying to control the world with financial repression and military adventures, just as Rome did under its emperors; but US political institutions under Trump have taken an increasingly corrupt and autocratic (kinglike) form.

The US empire is now in decline. This is starkly indicated by the rising net liabilities of the US economy to the rest of the world ie. foreigners own more US assets that US investors own of foreign assets. It is significant that the US net international investment position went negative just as the US became the sole hegemonic power in the early 1990s. 

US imperialism had managed to see the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it was losing relatively in trade and output to other major economies, particularly China.  Europe had integrated further into the Eurozone and widened towards eastern Europe using the cheap labour supply available there.  And the Asian tigers leapt forward with new technologies. But particularly China took over as the manufacturing and trading global power (partly driven by US multi-nationals which had located there in the 1990s).

The negative investment position of the US reflects the inability of US industry to compete in world goods markets. The reaction of the Trump administration to the high US trade deficit has been to impose tariffs and other measures to ‘protect’ American industry and reduce imports, but with no discernable success. So increasingly, the US has relied on foreigners buying more US companies and stocks (‘the kindness of strangers’) to finance its trade deficit. 

There is still a long way to go before the mighty US economy will be on its knees.  It may have the largest net liabilities globally, but it can manage that because it is also the only country that can issue dollars – and the dollar is still the international currency for trade, investment and reserves.  Trade surplus nations like Germany, Japan and China must use most of their dollar earnings to buy dollar assets in the US economy.  So the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of the dollar keeps the US empire ticking over.

Moreover, US investments abroad may be less in value than foreign investment into the US, creating the negative investment position, but foreigners earn less income on those US assets than US investors do on their foreign assets.  So there is a net surplus in income for the US of at least 0.5% of GDP on average since 2008, to add to its domestic economy. 

The US has not yet reached a ‘tipping point’ where the size of its net liabilities to foreigners is so high that its net income surplus disappears.

From its peak of economic and military power in the Med in 200 BC, Rome took several centuries to decline and fall. It won’t be so long in the modern capitalist world.  Maybe down the road, the US leaders will become more desperate and try to provoke China into a conflict. But China is unlikely to give Trump and the US globalists an excuse for outright war. As Xi says, China will not fall into the T-trap.