Monday, August 3, 2026

Theories of inflation part two – heterodox and Marxist

 

Theories of inflation part two – heterodox and Marxist

This is the second part of my discussion of the causes of inflation in modern capitalist economies, based on an unpublished paper by Guglielmo Carchedi and me. Part 1 is here.

by Michael Roberts

There are various heterodox views on the causes of inflation. Generally, they argue against the mainstream focus on monetarism, excess demand and inflation expectations as discussed in part one. The heterodox views can be divided into two. First, there are those who suggest the focus should be on the sectoral structure of the economy, namely how supply constraints lead to price surges in certain sectors of the economy and then, through input-output linkages and changes in firms’ pricing behavior, spread to the whole economy. And second, there are theories based on the view that inflation is caused by class conflict ie workers’ demands for higher wages and the response of capitalists.

In the sectoral view, some turn to corporate price ‘mark-ups’ as an explanation of inflation i.e. inflation is caused by monopolies and their power to impose market prices above ‘free competition’ prices. Monopolies can raise their profit mark-ups and sale prices if costs rise, including labour costs.  Stephanie Kelton, the well known ‘modern monetary theorist’, explains that “companies with enough market power can also unilaterally raise prices in a quest for greater and greater profits.” 

Marx would disagree. Yes, the market price of commodities sold can and will deviate from the production price, the price at which all capitals produce commodiities at the same average rate of profit (a rate that is always moving). If the price of production that is based on the average rate of profit in the economy falls, then all individual prices revolving around that should fall as well. But there is a degree of freedom within which some firms might lower their price less than the average or even increase it. However, this ‘monopoly’ ability to do this always has limits. Competition will tend to rule, even with oligopolies. So the market ‘monopoly’ price cannot deviate for long from the price of production.

In the recent inflationary spike after the pandemic slump, the sectoral theory has taken a different form. In this view, inflation is due to supply constraints in key economic sectors, which is then amplified by firms raising markups due to their market power. Supply bottlenecks which spread through sectors in the economy initiate the inflationary process, but then markups by companies can go above the average, so putting additional pressure on prices. Isabella Weber and Even Wasner argue that rising prices in certain “systemically significant upstream sectors” provide an impulse for further price hikes. To protect profit margins from rising costs, downstream sectors propagate, or in cases of temporary monopolies due to bottlenecks, amplify price pressures. 

The evidence for profit-led sectoral driven inflation has some basis in the recent post-pandemic inflation spiral, but can it be considered as a general explanation of inflation in capitalist economies?  Inflation has existed long term in the major economies even when there have been no increased mark-ups by companies or when there are no spikes in raw material prices. Sure, prices in oligopolistic markets are likely to be higher than in more competitive markets, but higher inflation can occur both with fairly competitive or oligopolistic market structures. In the late 19th century, the so-called Gilded Age Era was characterized by the rise of cartels, but with deflation in prices; and the 1990s, often seen as a second Gilded Age with increasing market concentration, experienced a so-called Great Moderation in price inflation ie disinflation (as shown in part one). Indeed, in the last big inflationary spiral of the 1970s, profits actually fell. According to Sylos-Labini, writing then:“the decline of the share of profits in several capitalist countries can be attributed primarily to the persistent increase of direct costs in labor, raw materials, and energy.” I shall return to the discussion about so-called ‘sellers inflation’, profit mark-ups and sector-driven inflation in part four when I analyse the post-pandemic inflationary spike to date.

The second heterodox explanation for inflation is that it is due to class conflict. This heterodox theory rejects Keynesian theory that attributes inflation to wage-cost pushes resulting from excess demand and worker bargaining power. Instead, this theory reckons that wages rise in response to price rises, as Marx argued. But what about the cause of the original spurt in inflation? This will be due to supply disruptions or mark-up power by monopolies – so back to the first heterodox theory. But inflation will continue, depending on whether workers have sufficient labour power to respond, leading to further attempts by companies to compensate by hiking prices further.Thus inflation depends on the balance of class power between workers and capitalists.  But this theory provides no explanation of the initial inflation of overall prices, except the contingent factor of a supply disruption or ‘shock’. And it falls back on the initial trigger for any price surge being due to increased markups or supply constraints as in the sectoral argument above.

There are some overtly Marxist theories of inflation. One ‘Marxist’ explanation of inflation is merely the monopoly mark-up price theory as described above. Baran and Sweezy (1966) explained the cause of inflation as follows: “Keynesian theory assumed free competition; under oligopoly, increased demand leads to rises in prices … and ultimately (as a result of the rising cost of living) to higher wages rather than an expansion of output. The result is general inflation.” Similarly, Kotz (1982) argued that monopolies can set market prices that exceed prices of production. But monopolies since the end of WWII have existed both during the inflationary period (1949-1979) and even increased market power in the disinflationary period (1980-2021). So generalised inflation must be explained aside from monopolies. Indeed, if monopolies have the power to increase uncontrollably their market prices, why do they choose to do so only in very certain circumstances? Specifically, they have chosen to raise their prices significantly only twice in recent economic history (in the late 1970s and in 2021), namely when profitability was low.

Paul Mattick Snr argued that “inflation is an expression of inadequate profits that must be offset by price and money policies … If prices rise faster than wages, then what could not be extracted from the workers in production is taken from them in the circulation process.” (1977, Chapter 3). This is evident. If prices rise faster than wages, there is a pro-capital redistribution at the cost of wages. And if prices grow less than wages, there is a pro-labour redistribution at the cost of profits. But neither explains any cause of the initialrise in the general price level.

Ernest Mandel (1987) attempted a Marxist explanation that involves money: if “paper money circulation has doubled without a significant increase in the total labour time spent in the economy, then the price level will tend to double too.” But why does money in circulation not just match the change in the value of commodities as measured in total labour time? Mandel is close to identifying the relevant factors in inflation, but without an analysis of how they combine.

Harman (1979) correctly identified that the profitability of capital was a key cause of inflation. But Harman adopted a subjective analysis: “in a boom, capitalists feel confident that their goods would sell, even if they increased their prices. … Once the recession sets in, capitalists have to respond … \[by\] contracting markets \[and\] have to slash prices.” This presents the capitalist reaction to a boom and price inflation, but does not explain the cause of inflationary or alternatively disinflationary periods. For example, it cannot explain the persistence of disinflation from the 1980s to 2019. There is no explanation of how movements in profitability are relevant and no recognition of the impact of the monetary authorities.

Choonara (2021) also underscores the role of profitability as the core cause of rising prices: “inflation depends on the interrelation between value creation through the expenditure of labour power, the creation of money (primarily through the credit system), and the relationship between capital accumulation and profit rates.” This is closest to our ‘value theory of inflation’ that I shall deal with in a later post.

The two most thorough Marxist explanations of the causes of inflation are by Anwar Shaikh and more recently, by Greek Marxist economists Stavros Mavroudeas and Athanasios Chatzirafailidis.

Shaikh does not like to call his theory Marxist, preferring ‘classical’. He argues that “modern inflation is the balance between a demand-pull generated by new purchasing power and a supply-response depending on profitability and the degree of growth utilization.” The combination of these two provides “a general theory in which inflation responds positively to new purchasing power because the portion of the latter which is not absorbed by current supply spills over into price increases; and negatively to net profitability, since this raises real output growth; and positively to the growth-utilization rate insofar as the latter inhibits real output growth.”

Where does this ‘new purchasing power’ that represents demand come from?  It comes from new domestic credit from private and central banks, ie in effect an increase of money in circulation.  The supply capacity to meet this increase in demand depends on the profitability of capital, which is the ‘motivation’ for investment.  If the stock of capital rises, it will provide an increase in capacity to produce and allow more ‘growth utilisation’, ie more real output.  If the stock of capital falls, the capacity to produce is lowered. In other words, Shaikh is saying that inflation is caused by aggregate demand exceeding supply capacity. If the profitability of capital rises, then capitalists will increase supply and inflation will be avoided. If the profitability of capital falls, then supply capacity will fall and inflation will emerge.

So inflation is driven up by increased demand (new purchasing power) and by low supply capacity, the latter being caused by falling profitability.  Inflation slows or disappears if new purchasing power is satisfied by rising supply and that will tend to happen when profitability rises. Thus in the period when US profitability fell (1964-82), the increase in supply capacity slowed and inflation accelerated.  In the period 1982-2007, when profitability rose, supply capacity rose and inflation decelerated. Shaikh provides empirical evidence to support this theory, while at the same time, refuting the Keynesian Phillips curve. I have reproduced his graph 15.10 from his magnum opus, Capitalism, p711 and recalculated it.

The graph shows a high correlation (0.63) between rising inflation and the using up of capacity (in other words, a slowing increase in supply) and vice versa. The correlation is very high in the inflationary (accelerating inflation) sub-period 1948-1981 (0.83) and still relatively strong in the disinflationary (slowing inflation) period from 1982-2010 (0.59).

Stavros Mavroudeas and Athanasios Chatzirafailidis define inflation as the phenomenon “in which the total sum of market prices significantly exceeds the total sum of prices of production for an appreciable period in the economy.” A strong and persistent inflationary phenomenon (namely the rise in total market prices above the total prices of production) arises when the capitalists’ demand for more means of production significantly exceeds investment for a considerable period.  

Why would demand exceed investment for periods?  Mavroudeas and Chatzirafailidis fall back on Marx’s reproduction schema as in Volume 2 of Capital.  For them, inflation is due to the systematic over-accumulation of capital and specifically due to an incessant demand for more means of production. Investing in more means of production relative to labour drives up the organic composition of capital, which in turn eventually leads to a fall in profitability which slows investment and delivers weaker output growth. So demand outstrips supply and market prices rise above prices of production and inflation ensues.

Both theories have the merit of placing the role of profitability of capital at the centre of the causes of inflation. Unlike Shaikh, Mavroudeas and Chatzirafailidis emphasise that the supply side in Marxist terms depends on the growth in the value of commodities: “inflation should not simply be perceived as a process in which the market prices of commodities are vaguely rising above an arbitrary “normal” price level. On the contrary, they should have the values of commodities as their “anchors.”  

But in my view, both theories do not provide a complete Marxist theory of inflation.  While Shaikh says that aggregate demand is driven by credit growth or money in circulation, which in my view is correct, he offers no explanation why that demand should accelerate or decelerate. What he does not explain is why demand does not also sink along with a fall in supply capacity and thus avoid inflation. After all, that is what happens in a slump. Also his emphasis on capacity utilisation rather than on the rate of growth in value for the supply side of the inflation equation suggests a Keynesian excess demand theory rather than Marxist value theory.. 

In contrast, Mavroudeas and Chatzirafailidis put the value of commodities firmly as the anchor for prices of production around which market prices fluctuate. But they have no role for money. For them, inflation of prices in a capitalist economy is purely a real, not a monetary phenomenon. They start with the assumption that money is a commodity (gold), which rules out the role of money in inflation. This is unrealistic in modern economies where money can be created by central banks and governments (fiat money) that is not tied to the value of the gold commodity. In modern economies, money growth can diverge from growth in the value of commodities and so affect market prices.  Without money in the story, we cannot explain why demand should outstrip supply and cause inflation.

In part three, I shall present what Carchedi and I call a ‘value theory of inflation’, which incorporates the role of the profitability of capital, changes in the value of commodities and the role of money.  Bringing all these together offers a more comprehensive theory.

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