by Michael Roberts
The pressure on Cypriot
leaders finally worked. Cyprus’ parliament had thrown out the plan to
levy the bank deposits of ordinary Cypriot citizens – a plan drummed up
by Cyprus right-wing president Nicos Anastasiades and the EU leaders.
The Cypriot leaders then appealed to its Russian ‘benefactors’ (the main
foreign bank deposit holders) to give them a new loan to bail them
out. But Anastasiades’ Russian pals refused to help – they did not want
to make a new loan as it would eventually have to be written off. Good
money after bad.
So Cyprus has been forced to return to the idea of a hit to deposits
to find enough money to trigger the EU-IMF bailout funds of €10bn. The
final deal is a ‘restructuring’ of the second biggest bank, Laiki, with
deposits over €100,000 (so-called uninsured) being frozen for use in
restructuring and the largest Bank of Cyprus may also be hit with a levy
on uninsured deposits and will take on the debt that Laiki has with the
ECB. All other bank deposits will be untouched.
This measure means
big losses for Russian depositors and the end of banking as we know it
in Cyprus. Apparently, the plan to restructure Laiki angered
Anastasiades so much that he threatened to resign rather than see his
beloved ‘casino banking’ centre wiped out- yet another example of his
great leadership of the Cypriot people.
Along with a package of further austerity measures and significant
sales of public assets, this will raise enough funding to meet the
demand of the Troika for about €6-7bn to add to the €10bn Troika
bailout. Cyprus faced a Monday deadline to clinch a bailout deal with
the EU or the European Central Bank says it would cut off emergency cash
to the island’s banks, spelling certain collapse.
The aim of making Cyprus pay part of the bailout is two-fold. First,
the German and other Euro leaders did not want to bail out in full all
those Russian oligarchs and ‘mafia’ who used Cypriot banks as tax havens
and money launderers. It would look bad in German parliament just
months before a general election to have to explain why Russian crooks
should get German money because Cyprus banks acted like money
prostitutes for Russians and then went on a speculative spending spree
across Europe. Second, the IMF was concerned that if the bailout came
completely from EU-IMF loans it would take Cyprus public sector debt to
above 150% of GDP and there would little prospect of getting that debt
down over the foreseeable future (as the graph below shows). So Cyprus’
public sector could end up defaulting or being bailed out again. So a
‘bail-in’ of bank assets was necessary.
The levy on deposits is unprecedented in the Eurozone, as is the
proposal to introduce capital controls so that Cypriots, Russians and
other foreigners cannot take all their money out of Cyprus when the
banks open on Tuesday. For the first time in the Eurozone, a member
state is taking people’s savings and blocking the movement of euros
within the Single Currency area in order to pay its bills. This is
breaching EU Treaty rules. It is a big sign that the Eurozone area is
in deep crisis. The impact on deposits in banks in other EMU states
like Greece, Spain or Portugal could be damaging. Depositors will look
to get outside the risk of capital controls being applied again within
the Eurozone.
Small depositors have been spared a ‘haircut’ in their savings, but
remember there are still ordinary citizens with over €100,000, as for
many this constitutes their life savings in their old age. It is not
all Russian oligarchs or tax-hiding wealthy foreigners – many of these
had already got their money out or move it to Swiss bank accounts. And
then there is the hit to bank workers. It is not their fault that their
boards and the politicians built up a ludicrous financial albatross
round the necks of Cyprus and then tried to defend this huge ‘rentier’
financial centre at the expense of depositors and bank staff. Cyprus
has a skilled workforce; with possibilities to to develop manufacturing
and services industries; and it has gas reserves soon to come on line.
It did not need such a distorted economy. Bank workers and public
sector workers (photo below) are now to lose their jobs and pensions as
Laiki is ‘restructured’ and the whole banking system is shrunk by half
over the next few years.
As Paul Krugman put it in his blog: “The Cyprus mess shows just
how unreformed the world banking system remains, almost five years after
the global financial crisis began.A few Cypriot banks bet big on Greek
bonds, very big, and their losses are about one-third of Cypriot G.D.P.
Why would anyone want bank executives and traders to be in a position to
do this much damage to a country? But step back for a minute and
consider the incredible fact that tax havens like Cyprus, the Cayman
Islands, and many more are still operating pretty much the same way that
they did before the global financial crisis. Everyone has seen the
damage that runaway bankers can inflict, yet much of the world’s
financial business is still routed through jurisdictions that let
bankers sidestep even the mild regulations we’ve put in place. Everyone
is crying about budget deficits, yet corporations and the wealthy are
still freely using tax havens to avoid paying taxes like the little
people.”
Cypriot politicians and bankers were so swept up in the short term
benefits of the Mediterranean island’s adoption of the euro that they
ignored warnings over the resulting lending boom. Banks’ loan books
expanded almost 32 percent in 2008 as its newly gained euro zone status
made Cyprus a more attractive destination for banking and business
generally, but Cypriot banks maintained the unusual position of funding
almost all their lending from deposits. That supposedly protected them
from the credit crunch and global financial collapse in 2008-9, where
banks that relied on inter-bank borrowing like Northern Rock, Dexia etc,
went down. But then the Cypriot banks stimulated a property bubble in
the island and funded it by ‘hot money’ from abroad, namely Russia. And
the bank boards, like those in Iceland and Ireland, got hubris. They
could do no wrong and the politicians were happy to agree for a slice of
the action.
The rapid expansion of bank assets left Cyprus with a banking system
eight times the size of its national output, as its accommodative regime
of not taxing foreigners’ dividends and capital gains lured investors
from countries like Russia. A depositor would have earned 31,000 euros
on a 100,000 euros deposit held for the last five years in Cyprus,
compared to the 15,000 to 18,000 euros the same deposit would have made
in Italy and Spain, and the 8,000 euros interest it would have earned in
Germany, according to figures from UniCredit.
Bulging deposit books not only fuelled lending expansion at home, it
also drove Cypriot banks overseas. Greece, where many Cypriots claim
heritage, was the destination of choice for the island’s two biggest
lenders, Cyprus Popular (Laiki) Bank and Bank of Cyprus. About 30
percent (11 billion euros) of Bank of Cyprus’ total loan book was
wrapped up in Greece by December 2010, as was 43 percent (or 19 billion
euros) of Popular. More striking was the bank’s exposure to Greek
debt. The Bank of Cyprus’s 2.4 billion euros of Greek debt was enough
to wipe out 75 percent of the bank’s total capital, while Laiki’s 3.4
billion euros exposure outstripped its 3.2 billion euros of total
capital. Bank staff, who mostly got small bonuses and annual pay rises
of around three or four percent, were unhappy about the mounting
exposure to Greece but powerless to stop it. The banks could survive a
maximum 25 percent loss on their Greek bonds. The “haircut” on Greek
debt imposed on private creditors ultimately agreed by the EU leaders,
including Cyprus’ then president Demetris Christofias, was more than 70
percent, heaping losses of 4.5 billion euros on the banks. The ricochet
of the crisis across the Eurozone finally brought Cypriot banks to
their knees.
So is this deal the only way out? No, no, no. Cyprus could pay for
the recapitalisation of its bust banks itself without having to take a
Troika bailout. There are at least €30bn in deposits held by
tax-dodging foreign-based individuals and companies. A bank bailout
would cost €10bn maximum but if the four largest banks were restructured
into one state-owned bank with any worthless assets siphoned off and
sold, that would reduce the ultimate cost. Bank staff could be
guaranteed a job in the state-owned banking system or retraining on full
pay for a new job. Also there is €2.5bn in bank bond debt held by
foreign banks (including Greek) that could be written off.
A 50% levy on foreign-based deposits plus the writing off of bank
debt and the restructuring of the banks would raise €20bn, more than
enough to sort out the banks and provide support for bank workers and
others that may have a case of need. Then a properly run banking system
can be established owned by the Cypriot people, garnering deposits from
citizens and lending it back to residents and small businesses on the
island. Instead, this deal protects senior bank bond holders (other
banks), threatens thousands of bank jobs, imposes severe fiscal
austerity and a permanent depression in the Cypriot economy for the rest
of this decade, at least.
The leader of the Church of Cyprus, the island’s largest property
owner, said after the Sunday mass in Nicosia that on Thursday he is
going to host a dinner with the chiefs of Russian companies that are
active in Cyprus to convince them against taking their money away from
the island so that the situation does not deteriorate further. He
blamed the previous Communist-led government for the mess and said that “Cypriot people must learn to live on tighter budgets”. The
church leader is worried that his Russian friends will flee. Maybe if
church property was sold off, it could help bank staff keep their jobs
and pensions.
And my alternative would enrage not only the Russian oligarchs and
their government, it would also be against the interests of the
financial and church elite in Cyprus who are in league with rich
Russians and other Eurozone banks. And it would mean losses for the ECB
which has lent credit (€9bn to Laiki). Banks holding Cypriot bank debt
would go to international courts to get their money back. And a
Cypriot government that did not impose austerity and privatisations
would be breaking the fiscal compact targets of the Eurozone. But
breaking Euro law is already being envisaged with the measure of capital
controls in this ‘emergency’.
This is an emergency too for the Cypriot people. A fearless Cypriot
government could ‘bank’ on its people (and those in other Eurozone
countries like Greece) to support them in arguing its case with the Euro
leaders. The Euro leaders could provide solidarity support with
funding, but they won’t. The terms of EU-IMF funding deal means selling
Cypriot jobs, savings and resources to pay for it.
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