Discussion Paper
The Nature of the New European Left
by Stephen Morgan, Brussels. November 2015.
by Stephen Morgan, Brussels. November 2015.
Contents:
Part
1: Southern Europe
The
background to the emergence of the New Left.
The
rise of the New Left.
How
far-left are the “Far-Left”?
Part
2 : Northern Europe
Germany
France
Britain
Part
3 : The New Left and the Nationalist Movements
Scotland
Catalonia
Brief Conclusions
PART 1
SOUTHERN EUROPE
The background to the emergence
of the New Left.
From Stephen Morgan in Brussels
The author can be reached at: we_know_whats_up@yahoo.com
From Stephen Morgan in Brussels
The author can be reached at: we_know_whats_up@yahoo.com
1) The growth of the New Left is a critically important
development, symptomatic of a sea change in class relations and a shift towards
the left in society worldwide. It has arisen out of the ashes of the Great
Recession of 2007-2009, the severe budget crisis, the swinging austerity
measures and the massive attacks on the working class.
2) The capitalist crisis first found its political
expression with the election of left-wing governments in South America,
followed by the revolutions in the Arab world, and then the sudden rise of
anti-capitalist youth movements in the form of Occupy and 99% protests.
3) Despite its derailment, the Arab Spring put the word
“revolution” back on the lips of a new generation of workers and youth. The
events in Tunisia and Egypt captivated people worldwide. It showed the immense
latent power of the masses and their ability to bring down even the most brutal
dictatorships in the world. Imperialism was paralyzed and looked on helpless as
its stooge dictators in Tunisia, Egypt
and Yemen fell like ninepins. The revolutions inspired millions of youth and
workers worldwide, empowering them with the belief that they could bring down
unpopular governments and change society for the better.
4) In the advanced capitalist countries, the perceived
omnipotence of capitalism – which followed the fall of the planned economies
and the economic boom – was shattered by the 2007 crisis. Capitalism lost its
credibility as the best of all possible systems, in the best of all possible
worlds. Massive hatred exploded against
the banks and the super rich – not just
among the youth, but among wide layers of society.
5) The colossal budget deficits in Southern Europe have
prolonged and deepened the crisis which began in 2007. Under the dictates of
the IMF-EU-EB Troika, governments have been forced to carry out the most
draconian austerity measures and vicious attacks on the working class in living
memory. The region has experienced an economic catastrophe as bad as the Great
Depression of 1929. Southern European countries fell into negative growth rates
with unemployment rocketing to an average of 25% and a staggering 50% among
youth, while more than 1 in 3 people were thrown under the poverty line.
6) Public services were decimating, salaries and pensions
were slashed, and job security and worker's rights were severely undermined.
Homelessness rocketed as tens of thousands of people lost their homes through
foreclosures or couldn't afford to pay their rents. Large layers of the middle
class, as well, were ruined, particularly the self-employed, and those in the
retail and building sectors. Many other
small businesses went to the wall.
7) This abrupt rupture with the rising living standards in
the pre-2007 economic boom has led to an increase in class consciousness and
political understanding, as well as an upsurge in militancy among workers and
youth. These harrowing economic conditions and the radicalization of youth and
workers, which followed, provided the objective conditions for the rise of new
left formations.
The Rise of the New Left
8) The New Left's stinging attacks on capitalism and the
Establishment has found a wide echo among youth and radicalized layers of
workers. From previously negligible support of 2-4% prior to 2009, they have attracted a mass or
semi-mass following in Greece, Spain and Portugal. The most spectacular was
SYRIZA in Greece which grew from 4.6% in 2009 to 36% in 2015. Podemos, which
was created in 2014 rose from 8% to around 28% in January, 2015. Podemos'
growth in the first year after it was set up was phenomenal, mushrooming from a
small group into a mass movement of 300,000 members and 1,000 branches
throughout the country. In the local elections in the major cities, it
outstripped PSOE and the parties of the ruling class, taking control of Madrid
and Barcelona in left coalitions with other parties and independent left
candidates.
9) On a smaller scale, the Left Block (BE) in Portugal has
grown from 6% to 11% today. Together with votes for the Communist parties or
their coalition fronts, this pushes support for the left among the population
in Spain and Portugal to over 20%, making them the 3rd or 4th
largest political forces in the two countries. Their rapid growth undoubtedly
reflects the potential for mass revolutionary parties to arise in periods of
severe capitalist crisis.
10) The Communist parties in Southern Europe also continue
to attract an important layer of workers, although not on the same scale as the
New Left. They have also grown, but not as impressively, with average votes of
between 8% to 10%. Moreover, in all of the countries they still control large
trade union federations.
11) However, the CPs have never been able to revive there
historical support in the workers' movement. During the 20s and 30s the CPs had
massive support in all three countries, but in the first free elections in Southern
Europe, they were only able to win between 9%-12%, similar to their support
today. The main reason for this is that they became tainted by their
association with the Stalinist dictatorship. In the mid-70s, the central goal
of the workers and middle classes was to achieve democracy and replacing a
fascist dictatorship with a Stalinist dictatorship held little attraction to
the masses. The in the 1980s, the CP was squeezed out by a big wave towards the
socialist parties throughout Europe. Since that time, the CPs have suffered a
double-blow undermining their credibility with the collapse of the planned
economies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it looks unlikely
that they could grow substantially more than at present. This, in turn, has
contributed to the growth of the New Left as an alternative force.
12) What is also clear from the situation in Southern Europe
(and in Europe as a whole) is that the shift to the left isn't uniform, but
manifests itself in different ways, to different degrees and at a different
pace in different countries. This is due to the fact that each country has its
own unique character, history, and culture, and the conjuncture of economic
processes and political events has had different results. So for example,
unlike Southern Europe, the shift to the left in Britain hasn't resulted in new
independent left formations, but has found expression in a shift to the left in
the traditional workers' party, with the election of left-wing, Jeremy Corbyn
to leader of the Labour Party.
13) These divergences in the radicalization of society and
the development of the left have also been illustrated graphically by events in
Italy. The shift to the left there – or rather the beginnings of a shift to the
left – has manifested itself in a more vague and somewhat bizarre form, with
the rise in support for the anti-establishment, Five Star Movement, led by the
popular comedian, Beppe Grillo, which has described itself as a populist party
outside traditional left-right politics.
14) Developments in the rest of Southern Europe have
influenced one another more directly than other countries. But even here, there
have also been significant differences in the way the left has evolved in each
country.
15) Events in Greece and Spain had similar beginnings. The
Greek anti-austerity movement, which began in 2010, was directly inspired by
the 15-M and the Indignados (Indignants) movements in Spain and called itself
the Indignant Citizens' Movement. But, while it helped to develop the radicalization
in Greek society, which eventually brought SYRIZA (The Coalition of the Radical
Left) to power, it played no substantial role in SYRIZA's formation or
development. Unlike Podemos, which sprung up from the anti-austerity movement
in 2014, SYRIZA was formed back in 2004, as a coalition of different left
groups such as dissident communists, left feminists, Greens and Trotskyists.
Nevertheless, it was, in general, lifted up on the back of the anti-austerity
movement and the radicalization in Greek society, as was Podemos in Spain.
16) Clearly, of all the new left groups, SYRIZA was the one
whose rise was the most spectacular. The fact that it was able to take power
was due to certain unique developments in Greece, which didn't happen on the
same scale in Spain and Portugal. In the first place, the Greek people suffered
the most catastrophic economic crisis of all the countries, with nearly 30% of
the population unemployed and 60% of youth out of work, and 45% of the
population living below the poverty line. Secondly, while both Spain and
Portugal experienced significant waves of strikes and demonstrations, the class
struggle in Greece intensified to a phenomenal level, with over 36 general
strikes in a period of two years, pushing Greece to the brink of revolution.
Such an unparalleled radicalization of the working class was a key reason why
SYRIZA's support rose to far higher levels than Podemos or the Left Block in
Portugal and laid the basis for them to become the largest political force in
the country.
17) Despite the close geographical and historical ties
between Spain and Portugal, the left has evolved differently in the two
countries. The economic crisis in Spain was the second worst in Europe and more severe than Portugal's. Unemployment in
Spain reached 25%,with 50% of the youth out of work and 25% of the population
living in poverty. In Portugal, however, although the working class suffered
dreadfully, unemployment peaked at around 15%, and 30% for the youth, while 18%
of people lived below the poverty line.
 |
| Podemos rally, Spain |
18) The greater severity of the crisis in Spain was a key
factor in why Podemos grew into a far larger movement than the Left Bloc in
Portugal - capturing about double the support in 2015. But this was not only
down to economic reasons, but political causes too. Although a new, grass root
anti-austerity movement did develop in Portugal, called the “12 March
Movement”– which organized some big protests in Portuguese cities – it never
took on the same scale or level of organization as the 15-M and the Indignados
in Spain. Consequently, the 12 March Movement didn't give birth to a new mass
political force like Podemos. Similarly to SYRIZA in Greece, the Left Bloc in
Portugal is not a new phenomenon. It was established way back in 1999 from an alliance
of some Trotskyists and other left groups and has gradually increased since
then, but not with the same explosive force of Podemos or SYRIZA..
19) In Spain, the 15-M and the Indignados movement set down
a template from which Podemos could evolve. It organized networks of local
committees across the country, intervening directly in such things as
foreclosures, as well as putting forward a radical left programme for an end to
corruption and the nationalization of banks. Then, when it reached its limits
as a movement, Podemos emerged to take the movement onto a higher political
plane.
20) Its worth noting one other important factor which
contributed to the different character of developments in Spain compared to
Portugal and Greece, is the lingering influence of anarchism. Spain is the
country per se in the world with the richest history of anarchism, and where it
had the most profound effect on the workers' movement and political culture.
The anarchist movement in Spain began way back in the middle of the 19th
century and it played a key role in organizing the workers and giving them a
political voice. It is the only country where anarchism developed into a
genuine mass force. It created its own mass anarcho-syndicalist trade unions,
and its political front had a major influence on events until the end of the
Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s. Crushed under Franco, it has never
regained its former glory, but it still remains an influential force. Its
historical heritage has left a strong imprint on the nature of the current
protest movement. Even today in Spain, the anarcho-syndicalist trade union
federation, the CGT, is the third largest and claims a membership of up to
100,000, while representing some 2 million workers through industrial
committees and collective bargaining.
21) Even if anarchist organizations don't play a leading
organizational role in the protest movement, its influence can be seen in such
concepts as de-centralized, autonomous democracy in both the protest movement
and the running of society; the organizing of “People's Assemblies” to decide
policy; its strong anti-leadership, anti-state, anti-establishment and
non-party character, as well as its strategies of direct action. Another
example is the increasingly popular, radical left-wing nationalist party in
Catalonia, the CUP, which list “libertarian socialism” as its guiding
ideology.
22) The role of the traditional workers' parties throughout
Southern Europe – PSOE in Spain, the PS in Portugal and PASOK in Greece – greatly
facilitated the rapid growth of Podemos, the Left Block and SYRIZA. In all
three countries, the socialist parties have participated in governments during
the budget crisis and are seen as being largely responsible for implementing extreme
austerity measures and their disastrous consequences.
23) Disgusted and infuriated with their leaders, millions of
workers and youth turned their backs on these parties, and their electoral
support plummeted. This opened up a political vacuum on the left which was
filled by the new left formations such as SYRIZA, Podemos and the Left Block
(BE) in Portugal.
24) This process was illustrated most dramatically in Greece
where PASOK was decimated, its support crumbling from 44% to 4.7%. A similar
thing happened to the socialist parties in Spain and Portugal, but not on the
same scale. In Portugal, the PS saw its share of the vote fall from 45% in 2005
to 28% in 2011 and, in Spain, PSOE's vote has fell from 42% to 28%.
25) There are complex reasons for why PASOK suffered so severely,
while the socialists in Spain and Portugal have managed to retain the support
of a sizable chunk of the working class voters. One factor is the depth of the
economic crisis in Greece and the second involves historical differences
between the parties.
26) While PASOK did gain the mass support of workers during
the period from 1980s to 2005, it might be more accurate to describe it as a
quasi-traditional party of the working class. Unlike other socialist parties –
which grew out of the early workers' movement at the end of the 19th
century – PASOK was created by a group of liberals in exile in 1974, and does
not have the close links to the trade unions which other socialist parties in
Europe have. Consequently, it lacks the historical and class ballast of the
other socialist parties, and this made it more vulnerable to severe swings in
public opinion.
27) The differences between PASOK and PSOE and the PS were
reflected in the results of the first elections in the mid-70s following the
fall of the dictatorships. Both PSOE and the PS emerged as the biggest
political parties, PSOE winning almost 30% of the vote and the PS capturing 38%
in Portugal. In contrast, PASOK only received 13% of the vote in 1974.
28) PSOE in Spain, on the other hand, has deep roots in the
workers' movement and close links to the unions. PSOE was formed during the
birth of the early workers' movement in the 19th century, and the
historic Spanish trade unionist and workers' leader Pablo Iglesias Posse played
a key part in its creation. PSOE also has a heritage from its leading role the
Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, and while, from a Marxist perspective, PSOE's
wrong policies were partly responsible for the defeat of the republican forces,
a Marxist sees the details of events, while the masses remember history in
broad brush strokes. PSOE is also credited as having played a leading role in
the overthrow of the Franco dictatorship in 1974. Consequently, it will take
more than its participation in carrying out austerity measures to uproot PSOE deep
foundations in the history of the Spanish workers' movement.
29) Although the PS in Portugal – like PASOK – wasn't formed
until 1974, the PS is seen as having played a key role in the 1974 Revolution,
and is credited with stopping the attempts at counter-revolution during that
period. In that sense, it shares something of PSOE's legacy derived from the
Spanish Civil War, and this has given it a stronger base than PASOK.
30) International factors also played a role in the growth
of support for the socialist parties in Southern Europe. Alongside the fall of
the dictatorships, there was a world economic recession in 1974 and 1979.
Consequently, there was a general swing towards the socialist parties across
Europe and the growth of the left-wings inside them in the 1980s. This was not
uniform everywhere, because of internal factors but percentages in election
results show a definite trend in that direction. In Germany, the SPD averaged
40% of the vote, the French PS averaged 35% and the pattern was followed by
PSOE at 43% and PASOK with 45% of the vote. The PS in France was in government
in France for 12 years consecutively, PSOE governed for 14 years non-stop and
PASOK ruled for 17 of the 19 years in the 1980s and early 90s.
31) The socialist parties in Spain and Portugal have
suffered a major drop in support recently, but they have not lost their core
support among the working class, like PASOK has. However, their betrayal of the
working class during the budget crisis, coupled with the CPs decline, has been
a critical factor in the emergence of the New Left.
How Far left are the “Far-Left”?
32) The capitalist press have described the New Left groups
as “far-left” in an effort to discredit them, undermine their popularity and
create fear about who they are and what they stand for. But they have failed.
Social developments are far more important in forming pubic opinion than
capitalist propaganda. But the question still remains about just how far-left
are these “far-lefts”?
33) While the New Left was based on an upsurge from below it
was organized from above by left-wing radicals and academics. Many of its
leaders, like Pablo Iglesias of Podemos and Alexis Tsipras from SYRIZA were
former Communist Party members active in left-wing politics. Although they
attract the support of many workers, the New Left did not arise out of the
workers' movement and its organizations. The new left coalitions are mostly
made up of various small groups of Trotskyists, dissident Communist tendencies,
Maoists, Greens and other leftist groups, and the majority of their activists
come form the middle classes.
34) All of these New Left formations are anti-austerity,
euro-skeptic, anti-NATO and, in broad terms, anti-capitalist. However, none of
them are explicitly socialist in their programme. They leave the nature of the
society they wish to create intentionally vague. Influenced by bourgeois public
opinion, they all fear that using the word “socialism” will scare away
potential supporters, especially the middle classes. Instead, they usually call
for a “Social Society” and a “Social Europe”, whatever that is supposed to
mean. What they really aim for is a more humane capitalism, and that doesn't
really differentiate then from progressive liberals. At least, the left-reformists
of the past had a concrete programme of taking over the banks and gradual
nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy with the openly stated
aim of achieving socialism.
 |
| Syriza 2012 election poster |
SYRIZA
35) Following SYRIZA”s betrayal of the working class while in
government, it may seem unnecessary to even comment about how “far-left” SYRIZA
really is. But so many people on the left had such hopes and illusions in
SYRIZA, that they forgot to take a look at its programme. Had they done so, it
would have been clear in advance that SYRIZA was not going to carry out a
socialist revolution. Looking at their original policies may help us to
anticipate how other New Left groups will develop.
36) Even before coming to power, SYRIZA explained that;
“The central strategy of SYRIZA is a new re-negotiation of
the debt and its interest payments. Its aims are centred on debt, the demand
for a new “Marshall Plan,” creating a “primary surplus” and a “balanced
budget,” control of the banks, in order to re-establish “creditworthiness” and
“sustainability.”
Not a word about the needed for a democratically controlled,
socialist planned economy, not even the need to nationalize the banks!
“Our program” it continues “is based on the values of
solidarity, justice, freedom, equality and environmental responsibility.”
37) Of course, Marxists also support those ideals, but the
programme is a utopian dream given the crisis capitalism and the budget
deficits. They could only be achieved under a democratically planned economy
and a socialist political system.
38) When it took power in 2015, SYRIZA could have mobilized
the working class to carry through the socialist transformation of society. It
had the overwhelming support of the majority of the Greek people in its battle
with the Troika, but it crumbled under the pressure and threats of the European
ruling class. SYRIZA lacked a solid theoretical foundations and clear strategy
to change society, and had insufficient roots and confidence in the working
class.
39) The tragic betrayal of the working class by SYRIZA in
Greece is an ominous omen of what can happen to the other Left formations.
SYRIZA was perhaps the most left-wing of the groups in Southern Europe, but
even so, they eventually ended up carrying out anti-working class policies in
the interests of the ruling class.
40) An usual situation has now developed in Greece. There is
undeniably huge anger and disappointment among youth and workers over SYRIZA's
capitulation, but it has managed to hold onto power in elections. Many people
thought it would be devastated by its actions, but that hasn't happened so far.
The reason for this is that the Greek masses were left with little alternative.
The small left split away from SYRIZA failed to gain any real support, because
it didn't offer a credible alternative of forming a government to fight
austerity and the might of the EU.
41) Likewise, the Greek Communist Party, which had about 8%
of the vote, was also not seen as a feasible option. Because of both its
Stalinist associations and a sectarian ultra-left policy towards SYRIZA in its
ascendant period, it lost a huge
opportunity to grow. Had the CP joined the SYRIZA movement at the beginning and
given its leaders critical support, it would have captured the ear and the
respect of a far wider layer of workers and youth. Then, if it had broken away
with the left-wing of SYRIZA following the betrayal, there was a chance that it
would have grown into a credible left-opposition and more layers of workers and
youth would have given it their support.
42) In the absence of such an alternative, the working class
was left to choose between continuing to support SYRIZA or supporting the
right-wing capitalist parties. They feared that the austerity programme anew
right-wing government would pursue would be even more vicious than when they
were in power before. Many thought that PASOK had at least tried to stand up to
the EU, and that, all-in-all, SYRIZA was the best of bad alternatives in the
hope that they would at least mitigate some of the worst excesses of an
austerity programme and protect the poorest and most vulnerable in society.
43) Whether SYRIZA will be able to continue as a political
force in the future will depend on a number of factors, particularly the world
economic situation, and whether they get credit for some recovery in the Greek
economy, as has happened in Spain, Portugal and Ireland. The future of PASOK is
unclear. It is doubtful that PASOK could regain its former place, so there is a
vacuum on the left and no other party which workers could support. Ironically,
having gained so much from the collapse of PASOK, SYRIZA may end up as a new
PASOK, and, at some point, it could also end up facing the same fate.
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| Left bloc poster: Merkel and Portuguese gov't |
Podemos
44) Podemos captured the support of millions of workers and
youth because of its withering attacks on capitalism and corruption, its clear
anti-austerity programme, its defense of the poorest section of the population,
and the positive reforms it put forward. With both the capitalist PP and the
PSOE stained by their role in attacking the working class, Podemos seemed to
offer a clear alternative to the discredited Establishment, and was looked on
by many as a party which could transform society along socialist lines.
45) Unfortunately, despite its profile, Podemos is not a
clearly defined socialist movement, and its programme is limited to working
within the confines of capitalism. In its “Economic project for the people” the
Podemos leaders state the following;
“In Spain as in (the rest of) Europe, there is no way to
achieve sufficient (economic) recovery unless debt decreases, and debt cannot
decrease unless the recovery materialises.”
Its main economic demands are;
·
“Flexibilisation” of the EU’s Stability and
Growth Pact (EU fiscal rules);
·
Change the rules that prevent the ECB from
financing governments;
·
Amend the ECB’s statute to include “full
employment” among its policy targets;
·
Make the ECB accountable to the European
Parliament, which should also be in charge of appointing ECB members;
·
Create mechanisms that guarantee the pooling of
debt and the effective supervision of the financial system at the European
level”;
·
Scrap the balanced budget rule from the Spanish
Constitution – which is basically tantamount to rejecting the EU’s ‘fiscal
compact’ on budgetary discipline.
·
Achieve real coordination of economic policies
in the Eurozone.”
Clearly, its entire perspective and
programme is aimed at reforming capitalism, rather than transforming society
along socialist lines.
46)
Podemos is now shifting to the right as witnessed by more and more
changes to its programme. For example, it has dropped its demands for a
“universal citizen’s income” because it would cost €145 billion which, they
say, is too much for the Spanish government. It is also now no longer advocating
the suspension of all foreclosures, but instead proposes negotiations between
debtors and creditors over mortgage payments.
In an interview with Associated
Press in October 2015, its leader Pablo Iglesias said "It's great that we
have rich people, but for the rich to be rich, the key is not to impoverish the
rest of the country."
47) The leadership of the party is
trying to tone down its radical policies to attract centrist voters, and this
is causing a split within Podemos along left/right lines. In April 2015, Juan
Carlos Monedero, a leadr and founding member of the group, resigned from the
party over its move to the right. In an interview he stated that “sometimes we
appear to be like those that we want to substitute” and that the party was trying
to make it “seem that we are good clean boys that won't give the powerful any
headaches.”
48) As it shifts towards the right,
Podemos is falling steeply in the opinion polls. In January 2015, it hit its
zenith capturing 28% backing from the electorate. But by September its support
had fallen to 18%, and in November to only 14%. Pablo Iglesias seems to think
that the only way top stop this is to go even further to the right, believing
that he is loosing supporters to the center Ciudadanos (Citizens) Party. This
is suicidal because Podemos will loose its identity as a real left-wing
alternative and with it the reason for its rapid rise in popularity.
49) Ciudadanos, who were originally
only active in Catalonia, burst onto the national stage only this year. They
are a populist center party giving off a progressive, but not left-wing image.
In some ways their rise has been even more spectacular than Podemos. From
nothing they managed to capture 16% of the vote in opinion polls in September
2015. In November, it rose to 22%, with the possibility it could come second in
the general election in December after the PP, pushing PSOE into third place.
50) Despite being a center party,
Ciudadanos' growth is nevertheless a result of austerity, the attacks of the
PP, and the treachery of PSOE. Many people don't want to vote either for the PP
or PSOE, but don't feel ready to support Podemos. Its support is mainly among
the middle classes, but it is attracting a section of workers for these same
reasons. While it isn't a leftward development, it is another symptom of an
anti-Establishment mood and a desire for something new and different. Broadly
speaking, when the two-party system begins to break down, it is indicative of
the more general crisis for capitalism.
51) As a result of the plunge in
its support and the rise of Podemos, PSOE's new leader, Pedro Sánchez, has been
forced to take a more anti-austerity stance. Furthermore, there are signs of
growing discontent and dissent within its ranks. PSOE's Catalan MPs voted against
the party over Catalan independence. There have also been clashes between PSOE
youth leaders and party heads, and in the recent elections for leader of the
party, a grouping called “The Socialist Left Platform” ran a candidate, Perez
Tapias, for election. A shift to the
left in PSOE is inevitable at some point, but as with other developments, it
wont take exactly the same form as in Britain or Portugal. When it does move
left, this will be another factor which can weaken support for Podemos.
52) SYRIZA's betrayal of the working class has definitely
undermined belief in other left groupings in Europe. Their credibility as a
real alternative to the traditional parties and as an effective force against
austerity has suffered and has certainly played a role in Podemos' decline in
support in opinion polls.
53) Another factor working against Podemos is the recovery
in the Spanish economy, which has also given the right-wing capitalist party a
slight lead in opinion polls for the December elections. Despite continuing
mass unemployment and poverty, we can not ignore the effect of an increase in
economic growth is having on political processes.
54) These mounting problems means
that there is a strong possibility that Podemos will split along left/right
lines. If its showing in the December 2015 general election is poorer than
expected, then a right-wing break away, possibility led by Pablo Iglesias,
could emerge and try to create a group similar to Ciudadanos, with a
center-left programme. It may even attempt to merge with Ciudadanos or, at
least form alliances with it. Podemos is already entering into coalitions with
PSOE at a local level. Continuing in this direction would sound the death knell
for Podemos. It is very likely that its 300,000 members would then fall into
inactivity, disillusioned with developments.
55) At the same time, a left-wing
could also break away from Podemos and try to set up a new grouping around its
original ideas and a new radical programme. However, that is unlikely to
attract the same support as the Podemos originally did. The best it could
probably do would be to enter into a coalition of the left with the IU
Communist party and the CUP in Catalonia.
56) The situation remains very
fluid. The future of the current left movement in Spain will depend on a number
of factors, including the economy, PSOE and whether Podemos shifts to the left.
If the economy goes into a new crisis, and if PSOE enters a coalition
government with the right-wing PP, that could revive the left. But even if Podemos
were to wither away, it wouldn't mark the end of the matter. Like the other
left movements in Europe, Podemos is just a harbinger of waves of left
movements to come in the future.
The Left
Block and CDU in Portugal
57) In Portugal, the Left Block (BE)
and CDU Communist alliance groups have together won more than 20% of the vote.
Like elsewhere, their success has been based on a combination of economic
crisis, austerity measures and the participation of the traditional workers'
party (PS) in carrying out these attacks on the working class while in
government. The BE and CDU is committed to quitting the Euro and NATO, as well
as calling for the nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy
58) The success of the BE and CDU
has pushed the leaders of the PS to the left. The PS now takes a far more
radical anti-austerity position than before, and they have included a series of
left demands in their programme. This includes a massive increase in public
spending to create jobs, improving education and health care, reversal of wage
cuts and an increase in pensions and the minimum wage, as well as stricter
rules to defend workers' rights and job security. Moreover, they have taken the
unprecedented step of trying to form a coalition government with the Left Block
and the Communist Party. At the time of writing, there is a constitutional
crisis, because the President has blocked the Left Coalition from forming a
government, despite them having over 50% of the vote. The PS is threatening to reject
the minority center-right austerity programme in Parliament and vows to pass a
vote of no confidence to bring down the government. This all has the potential
to cause a revolutionary crisis in Portugal, but the outcome is not yet clear.
59) However, there are already
worrying signs of a shift to the right in both left movements. In order to
enter the coalition the BE and CDU have dropped the most radical sections of
their programme, particularly a clear commitment to socialism. Unfortunately,
if they finally do enter a government coalition with the PS, all the elements
of SYRIZA-style sell-out are in place. There is a danger that they will
seriously undermine their popularity, if they support a PS government, since it
is unlikely to be able to carry out the promised reforms, and will probably
back down in the face of pressure from the European capitalists. Being part of
a new budget-cutting, austerity government would be disastrous for the Left.
The only way to maintain their levels of support, would then be to take a
principled stand against the PS and break from the coalition.
60) At the time of writing, the
Left Block appears to have made a deal with the PS to go into government. But
they can't form a ruling coalition without the agreement of the Communist Party.
There are encouraging signs that the CP will refuse to enter the coalition on
the basis of certain PS policies on budget cuts. If they stick to their guns,
this will pay off latter in increased support for the CP and its coalition. The
affect on the BE would probably be that left-wing would break away from it,
like in SYRIZA in Greece.
61) However, unless the left
coalitions develop in a clearly socialist direction, they are bound to drift to
the right and become programmatically indistinguishable from the rest of the
political parties on the center-left. Then, the support they originally
attracted can wither away, and they can find themselves again in the position
of small groups commanding 5% of the vote or less. The crisis of capitalism and
the continued betrays of the traditional workers' parties may keep them afloat,
but it seems unlikely that the left formations in Portugal will be able to repeat
the electoral success of SYRIZA.
France
79) The Left Front in France was
created in 2009, as an electoral alliance between the CP and a small break away
left-wing group from the PS, calling itself the Left Party (PG), led by the
well-known left-wing senator, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and some other leading figures
on the left in the PS – much like WASG led by Oskar Lafontaine in Germany. It
also attracted some non-party people and left-wing Greens.
PART 2
NORTHERN EUROPE
by Stephen Morgan
by Stephen Morgan
62) It would be impossible to cover
the developments of the left groups throughout the huge number
of countries in
the rest of Europe. Therefore, this will focus on the three largest left
formations in the three largest and most important countries, Germany, France
and the United Kingdom.
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| Results of German Elections 2014 |
63) There are both similarities and
differences between both the left groupings in Northern and Southern Europe and
between the northern left groups themselves.
64) Despite achieving 10%-15% of
the vote, the northern lefts have not had the same national or international
impact, which SYRIZA and Podemos have had. They have not shaken the
Establishment as much as the left has in the south. The exception to this is
Britain, where the election of the left-winger, Jeremy Corbyn to the leader of
the Labour Party has sent shock waves through the British political system and
the capitalist class.
65) The first obvious difference
between the Left movements in France and Germany and those in the south, is the
role the Communist parties have played. In the south, the CPs have remained
aloof from the new left formations, created their own coalitions and even stood
candidates against the new left. However, the CPs in Germany and France have
instead played a central role in bringing the left together into a major
alliance. Another major difference is that in both France and Germany,
dissident left-wing split-offs from the traditional workers' parties have also
played a prominent role in the development of these left coalitions.
Germany
66) The previous division of
Germany into the capitalist West and the Stalinist East has given a peculiar
twist to the development of the Left there. The Stalinist Communist Party which
was previously in power in East Germany, has been able to maintain an important
foothold in German politics after
reunification and capitalist restoration. Initially, it even continued
to be led by former leading members of the Stalinist bureaucracy, such as Gregor Gysi, a former high-ranking bureaucrat
in the governing Communist party. It, then, changed its name to "Party of
Democratic Socialism" (PDS), in order to try to improve its image,.
67) Although the PDS only scored
2.4% in the first elections in the reunified Germany in 1990, by 1998, it
increased its votes to 5% and gained 37 seats in the German parliament, the
Bundestag. However, its inability to grow beyond this led to an alliance with
the Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (WASG). WASG was made
up by a small break away group of left-wing Social Democrats (SPD) and some
trade unionists led by the well-know left-winger from the SPD, Oskar
Lafontaine. Other various left-wing groups like Trotskyists, dissident
communists, libertarians and social democrats have joined with them and the
coalition is now called Die Linke (The Left).The various groups can organize
themselves as tendencies and platforms with in it, although it is still
dominated by the old PDS.
68) Die Linke has gained strength
after the collapse in the popularity of the SPD, which fell from 38% of the
vote in 2005 to 23% in 2009 – following its participation in a four year
coalition with the right-wing CDU/CSU of Angela Merkel. In 2009, Die Linke
achieved a major breakthrough in support, winning 12% of the vote nationally
and 30% of the vote in the regions of the old East Germany – making it the
second biggest opposition party in parliament. Since then, it has also made
some major breakthroughs in regional elections in the west and the growth in
support for Die Linke has meant that the SPD has been forced to go into
governing coalitions with it in various regional states, most famously the
so-called “red-red”alliance governing the capital, Berlin.
69) However, the attraction of
sharing power through coalitions with the SPD in regional parliaments, and the
prospect at some stage of becoming part of a national coalition government is
shifting Die Linke to the right. Formerly, it is committed to democratic
socialism, but, in practice, its programme is based on Keynesian economics and
reforms within the context of capitalism. It lists its main aims as; “For More
Democracy, For a Fair and Socially-caring Society, One Europe for All, Against
War, For high quality education, A social energy policy.” If it shifts further
to the right and joins a national government with the SPD, then left-wing
sections within it would probably break-away.
70) The SPD is still the second
force in German politics, and continues to enjoy major support among workers.
It has historical roots going back to the formation of the German workers'
movement in the 19th century and retains close links to German
unions. The fact that it has begun to also consider a national government
coalition with the PDS and Greens shows that it is under pressure from left-leaning
members, and there is a clear left/right division among those wishing to
continue class collaborationist alliances with the capitalist parties and
others who favour moving to the left. At some point, probably during the next
economic crisis, it can be forced to the left, and left opposition groups will
emerge in its ranks, particularly in it youth wing. Some may remain in the
party to fight and others to break away like WASG.
71) The nature of Die Linke is a
reflection of the fact that independent left formations are part of the history
of the German workers' movement. In the early 1920s a left group broke away
from the SPD and founded the USPD (Independent Social Democratic Party), a
radical, left party moving in the direction revolution. At one point the USPD
had 750,000 members and 18% of the vote, however, splits led to demise and its
re-absorption into the SPD some years later. It was from within the ranks of
the USPD, that a group broke away to form the German Communist Party. In the
1920s, the Communist Party in Germany was one of the few genuinely mass
communist parties outside Russia.
72) Thus, the development of Die
Linke has roots in the political history and culture of Germany. However, it
seems unlikely that Die Linke, as now constituted, could ever imitate the
success of Podemos or SYRIZA. Die Linke's probably can't shake off its close
association with the old Stalinist Party and it also lacks the novelty and
freshness which SYRIZA and Podemos had.
73) Furthermore, the objective
conditions in Germany are less favorable at the moment than in Southern Europe.
Germany is one of the most prosperous countries in the world and weathered the
crisis of 2007-9 better than others, as well as not facing the problems of
budget deficits. Unemployment in Germany is only 4.7%, compared to more than
25% in Southern Europe, although there are great disparities in unemployment
and living standards between the East and West, which is one of the reasons for
Die Linke's continued support in the East.
74) For Die Linke to develop into a
mass force, there would probably need to be a huge crisis in Germany similar to
the 1920s. The history and culture of Germany suggests that there is a
probability that a left grouping such as Die Linke or similar new alliances
will remain part of the political landscape in the future and be a focus for
leftward moving youth and workers.
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| Strike against austerity April 2015 |
75) As in Germany, the Communist
Party (PCF) in France has played a key role in the organization of the Front de
Gauche (FG) meaning Left Front, although the histories of the parties are quite
different. Up until the 1970's, the French CP was the main traditional mass
party of the working class. The heroic role
its members played in the French Resistance to Nazi occupation in the 2nd
World War had a similar effect on its fortunes as the civil wars and
revolutions in Spain and Portugal did for the socialists.
76) Throughout, the post-war
period, the French CP remained the mass party of the workers. Between 1950-1980 its vote averaged 20%, compared
to 15% for the French Socialist (SFIO). Following its betrayal of the 1968
revolution in France, the old Socialist SFIO suffered a “PASOK-style”
disintegration, its vote crashing to a mere 5%. With a name change to simply
Parti Socialiste (PS), reconstituting itself as a new socialist party it slowly
began to recover, and its vote increased considerably after an alliance with
the CP in the 1970s.
77) In the 1980s, the CP entered a
coalition government with the PS under the leadership of Mitterrand. Under Mitterrand, the PS moved sharply to the
left. It introduced heavy tax increases of the rich, nationalized a number of
key companies, increased the minimum wage, introduced a 39-hour work and 5
weeks paid holiday per year, as well as increasing in social benefits, and
strengthen workers' rights. In effect, it implemented many CP policies and
more, and rather than the CP benefiting from this, the PS stole its cloak and
replaced the PS as the most radical party on the left. The PS vote rose to
around 35% in the elections and stayed in power for 12 years from 1981 to 1993.
This established the PS as the main
party of the working class in France and the CP was decimated. From an average
of 20% of the vote it fell to 10% in the late 80s and hit rock bottom in the
early 2000s, only being able to win about 4.5% of the vote.
78) In the current period, the PS
in France didn't initially suffer the same decline as other socialist parties,
principally because it was not in power during the same period from 2007-2012,
and therefore wasn't tainted with carrying out austerity measures and attacks
on the working class. In fact, its votes for parliament rose from 24.7% in 2007
to 29.3% in 2012, and in the Presidential elections of the same year, its
candidate, François Hollande, won with over 50% of the vote. However, this
changed dramatically and his popularity fell as low as 13% in 2015, principally
because of poor economic performance and a rising unemployment rate. But has
begun to recover to 20% as a result of a slight improvement in the
economy.
80) Apart from the CP and PG, the
FG has quite a mix of left groups in its alliance, including left socialists,
alternatives, left Greens, and a former Stalinist, pro-Albanian party! So far
Trotskyist groups like Lutte Ouvrière, which have a certain following in
France, have taken a sectarian attitude towards the Front de Gauche, describing
it as a “small bourgeois party” and standing its own candidates in elections.
It has even participated on PS election lists in some towns rather than
cooperate with other left groups.
81) The FG vote has risen for
similar reasons as in other countries, such as economic problems and
disillusionment with the PS, but it has also been spurred on by alarm at the
rise of the racist, right-wing National Front, much as did the Popular Front in
the 1930s.
82) Support for the FG has risen
from around 6.5% in 2009 to 11% for its Presidential candidate, Jean-Luc
Mélenchon in 2011, who was able to attract rallies of over 100,000 people in
Paris and Marseille. However, its vote fell back to 7% in the parliamentary
elections of 2012. It now has 23 MPs in its Parliamentary Group, called the
Democratic and Republican Left (GDR)
83) The FG has a list of reformist
demands similar to other new left groups in Europe, but unfortunately, like all
of them, it does not associate itself clearly with the aim of achieving
socialism. As an article in the Guardian observed;
“Mélenchon's growing number of
supporters view (his programme) as common sense and salutary: a 100% tax on
earnings over £300,000; full pensions for all from the age of 60; reduction of
work hours; a 20% increase in the minimum wage; and the European Central Bank
should lend to European governments at 1%, as it does for the banks. Here are a
few realistic measures to support impoverished populations. Is this a
revolution? No, it is radical reformism.”
84) France has strong revolutionary
traditions and a culture of radical socialist ideas. The inherent volatility of
French politics means that it could not be ruled out that the FG could
experience a Podemos-like growth in the future, probably during a new economic
recession. But France also has a long history of fluid and changing left-wing
electoral alliances and coalitions. Therefore, the FG could easily break up,
and new realignments on the left could emerge later on. But, the weakness of
the current economic improvement in France, the right-wing character of the PS
and the threat of the National Front means there are plenty of reasons why the
FG or new independent left coalitions will continue to exist in France.
116) Tony Blair's decision to go to war in Iraq was a
scandalous, Imperialist action. However, Blair was far from alone in the Labour
Party on such issues. Right-wing leaders of the Labour movement supported both
World Wars, helping to send more than one million British workers to their
death and provoking the slaughter of tens of millions of others around the
world. What greater betrayal of the working class is there than that?
Britain
 |
| Keir Hardy, founder of the Labor Party |
85) With the election of the left-winger, Jeremy Corbyn as
leader of the Labour Party, the swing to the left in Europe has taken on a very
different character in Britain. For historical and cultural reasons, it has
manifested itself “inside the Establishment,” so-to-speak, with a sudden and
unexpected shift to the left inside the British Labour Party. Unlike the rest
of Europe, no new autonomous left-wing movements, coalitions or parties have
arisen in the UK. Moreover, the Communist party in Britain is a tiny group
without any popular support and there has not been any left-wing splits from
the traditional party of the working class since the 1930s.
86) The British left-wing groups have never been able to
create alliances and attract substantial support, the left groups in Britain
have never been able to unite into anything of political significance. Where
independent left groups have stood in elections they have received derisory
results averaging 1-2%.
87) Nearly all the small left groups had written off the LP
as the traditional party of the working class, saying it had become an
irredeemable and unreformable “bourgeois party.” To prove their arguments they
pointed to the Blairite victory, the emptying out of the LP party membership,
the suppression of internal democracy, the dumping of the socialist Clause 4 of
the constitution and pro-Imperialist policies, as proof that a qualitative
change had taken place and the LP was no longer a workers' party. It was just
another capitalist party in Britain, we were told, no different in essence to
the Tories and Liberals. Unions should disaffiliate from it, they said, and
party members should leave and workers should stop voting Labour.
88) Consequently, these left groups were speechless when the
movement around Corbyn exploded. Because of their false analysis, they were
caught totally unaware and wrong-footed by events. The new left activists just
swept past them, not giving a second thought about becoming involved with these
tiny groups on the fringes of the labour movement
89) None of the left groups in Britain have been able to
capitalize on the favorable objective circumstances. They remain frozen in time
and splintered by extreme sectarianism. And while the UK has some history of
independent mass movements, such as the Tolpuddle martyrs, the Chartists and
the anti-Poll Tax struggle under Thatcher, none of them have resulted in the
creation of new, mass left-wing organizations.
90) The small left groups have been battling away for
decades to build their own mass revolutionary parties with abject failure.
There is no precedent in the history of the British Labour movement for the
development of mass independent revolutionary parties. Although, that doesn't
mean that it couldn't come about under very special circumstances, it is highly
unlikely to be the way in which a revolutionary movement will develop in
Britain.
91) Britain is a deeply conservative and traditionalist
country. It is reflected in such things as the monarchy, its ingrained culture
of parliamentarianism and the embedded, orthodox reformism of its Labour
movement. Of all the countries of Europe, it is probably the one with the least
heritage of revolutionary upheaval. Of course, in certain exceptional
circumstances, all of that can be reversed, but it would be very unwise not to
take these features into account when analyzing how British society could be
transformed along socialist lines. It should not be surprising then, that the
new left movements in society have found their reflection inside the Labour
Party in Britain.
92) The underlying cause for the shift to the left in the
Labour Party is the same as elsewhere – the
economic crisis, austerity measures and disillusionment with former, right-wing Labour governments. While on paper, the UK is a prosperous country, there are extreme disparities in income. 1 in 5 people live below the poverty line and many depend on handouts from food banks to survive. The youth have been hit hardest and are considered by many to be a “lost generation” with 15% of them unemployed and most of the rest working in low paid jobs with poverty wages. Furthermore, starting with the Labour government in power during the 2007-2009 recession, the working class has faced harsh austerity measures and swinging cuts in public spending, now continuing under a new Conservative (Tory) government.
economic crisis, austerity measures and disillusionment with former, right-wing Labour governments. While on paper, the UK is a prosperous country, there are extreme disparities in income. 1 in 5 people live below the poverty line and many depend on handouts from food banks to survive. The youth have been hit hardest and are considered by many to be a “lost generation” with 15% of them unemployed and most of the rest working in low paid jobs with poverty wages. Furthermore, starting with the Labour government in power during the 2007-2009 recession, the working class has faced harsh austerity measures and swinging cuts in public spending, now continuing under a new Conservative (Tory) government.
93) The right-wing, pro-capitalist policies of the “New
Labour” Blair-Brown leadership hit the working class hard and the LP paid for
it in terms of popular support. The LP fell from 355 seats in Parliament in
2005 to 232 in the 2015. It was wiped out in Scotland, suffering a PASOK-style
catastrophe, in which it lost 40 of its 41 MPs.
94) It has been said that the working class in Britain is
like an elephant, powerful, but very slow to move – until it begins a charge. A
contradiction of the British Labour movement is that under the right
conditions, its traditional inertia can be suddenly broken in an extremely
dramatic way. This is exactly what happened with the election of Corbyn. The
anger and disgust with the LP right-wing leaders and the plight of working
people had been building up over a long period of time, until suddenly the dam
broke.
 |
| Jeremy Corbyn |
95) Once just a glimmer of hope for changing the LP arrived
in the form of Corbyn's candidacy, Labour supporters pounced on it with both
hands. A huge movement of workers and youth began from below, and with the full
support of the majority of unions, Corbyn was suddenly lifted up on an
unstoppable wave that aimed to return the LP back to its fighting socialist
roots.
96) The left movement towards the LP took on a Podemos-style
scale. A half a million people became
involved in the campaign to get him elected – 99% of whom were not in
the LP to begin with. Within days of his victory, tens of thousands signed up
to join the party, taking its paid-up membership to over a third of a million.
97) From nowhere, a new left-wing youth section of the
Labour Party – Labour Young Socialists – sprung up and adopted a socialist
programme. At its founding conference it declared its aims and goals;
“We want to see capitalism replaced by socialism: a society
whose guiding principle is no longer profit, but solidarity; where common
ownership and democracy guarantee a good life for all.”
A position more clearly socialist than anything in the
programme of either Podemos or SYRIZA.
98) At the same time, the unions have begun to recover from
the long boom from 1990 to 2007, when class consciousness and combativity were
thrown back and union membership declined. Rank and file members of the unions
and grass root activists, furious with the relentless attacks on the working
class, are shifting to the left, as the class consciousness, political
understanding and militancy revives. Given the pivotal role of the unions in
the LP, it was inevitable that, at some point, this would find its expression
in internal developments within the party.
99) Consequently, the size and power of this movement around
Corbyn has left the right-wing paralyzed. Not that this will last. They will
bide their time until they think it is favorable to launch a counter-offensive
against Corbyn and a witch hunt against the left. But they will have to take on
the might of many affiliate unions, who have backed him and the enthusiasm of a
huge new layer of left-winger members. The entire history of the Labour Party
is a relentless battle between the left and the right for the leadership, and,
even if the right succeeded in driving back the left temporarily, that wont
stop the process. Corbyn's election is just the beginning of a protracted
struggle between the pro-capitalist right-wing and a working class left-wing
inside the Labour Party.
100) The same arguments about “bourgeoisification” have been
made about all the traditional workers parties in Europe, so it is worth making
a deeper analysis of the British Labour Party and its history, as a yardstick
to evaluate how other socialist parties in Europe may develop. They all have a
history of struggle between the left and right, and although this may evolve in
different ways to the specific course taken by the British Labour Party, there
will be a great many similarities.
101) To do that, we first need to get an overview of the
history of the British Labour Party. If you don't understand the past, you
can't possibly know how to orientate in the present or what to expect in the
future.
The Labour Party : A history
of relentless left/right struggles
102) Speaking at a meeting of the Labour Representation
Committee way back in 2004, (an organization inside the LP set up years ago to
fight for internal democracy and left policies) – at which Jeremy Corbyn also
spoke – the veteran socialist leader and former Labour MP, Tony Benn said:
“Things may seem very bad in the party, but if we can survive
Ramsay MacDonald, we can survive New Labour. I urge people to stay and fight in
the Labour Party.”
Even though it took another decade for this perspective to
be vindicated, Benn's insight and conclusions proved to be far more correct
than all the “theoreticians” of the far-left..
103) The whole history of the Labour Party is a history of
swings from left to right; of struggles between its pro-capitalist elements and
left-wing socialists; of gross betrayals of the working class and progressive
reforms – leading to the successive
emptying out and filling up again of the membership. This has always been set
against a background of alternating economic crises and capitalist booms, and
the influence of international events of both a progressive and reactionary
character.
104) From its very beginnings, The Labour Party has been a
broad, but fractious, coalition of right-wing and left wing currents from the
nominally Marxist SDF, to the right-wing Fabians, the left-wing ILP and the
trade unions. It was begun by the left-wing, ex-miner and workers' leader, Keir
Hardy, but it was joined in parliament by former Liberals, who became its
pro-capitalist agents.
105)More than any other socialist party in Europe, the LP is
characterized by the unions' direct role in creating it, as the political voice
of the working class and their continuing powerful influence in the structures
and policy-making apparatus of the party. Consequently, this organic link with
the unions has defined the LP's fundamental character as the traditional party
of the working class, which has never been broken – not even under Tony Blair.
The trade union link with the LP is a seal with seven seals, which cannot be
broken.
106) As Benn suggested by mentioning Ramsey MacDonald, the
betrayals of Blair are far from unknown and perhaps not even the worst which
the Labour Party has faced in its history. MacDonald, who led the first Labour
minority government of 1924 was just as much a shameless servant of big
business and finance capital as Blair was. He publicly denounced the 1926
General Strike, invoked emergency powers to break industrial disputes, carried
out severe austerity measures and cuts in workers' living standards in the
interests of capitalism.
107) In 1929, while leader of a second Labour government,
during the greatest capitalist crisis of all time – the Great Depression – he
opposed any economic measures to alleviate the suffering of the poor. Quite the
opposite, he actually cut unemployment benefit, in order to avoid any budget deficit.
108) When the Liberals proposed a government programme of
public works to give jobs to over half a million unemployed through projects
such as new roads, building council housing, and the expansion of telephone and
electrical services, MacDonald rejected this in favour of draconian right-wing
policies austerity measures, which made the working class pay for the banking
and financial crisis. At the time, the left-wing in the LP described
MacDonald's Labour's administration as a “Wall Street Government.”
109) Facing opposition from the left, MacDonald decided to
break with the Party and head a National Government in order to carry through
his Tory policies, and along with other right-wing traitors in the Shadow
Cabinet he formed “National Labour” to enter into a coalition government with
the Conservatives. It was a staggering betrayal of the working class, when
Labour was needed most to protect people from the ravages of the Depression.
Then, to top off his career as a traitor to the working class, MacDonald
accepted the position of Lord President of the Conservative Cabinet.
110) In the subsequent 1931 General Election, the massive
disillusionment with the Labour Party caused by MacDonald's treachery, led to a
crushing defeat for the party. The ILP (a left group in the LP) then drew the
conclusion that the Labour Party was finished and that they should break away.
Large numbers of workers had drawn revolutionary conclusions from the
experience of the capitalist crisis of 1929 and the ILP believed the shift to
the right in the LP presented an ideal opportunity for them to build a new
independent workers' party. Moreover, the ILP had a strong base amongst the
working class, far more than the current far-left groups do. It could boast
100,000 supporters and the nominal affiliation of 140 MPs. Consequently, they
split from the party in 1932.
111) But, the tactic proved to be a disaster. Within 3 years
it was left with just 4,400 members. They had completely misjudged the
situation, because, while they were leaving the party, the workers were moving
back into it. Instead of rallying to the ILP, the mass of workers turned once
more towards the LP and the party shifted to the left again.
112) The Labour Party then elected the left-winger George
Lansbury as leader. Lansbury had supported the Russian Revolution and traveled
to meet Lenin and Trotsky not long after. He also published his own ideas for
achieving socialism, which combined both reformist and revolutionary methods.
113) Following this swing to the left, all the right-wing
Labour MPs who had served in MacDonald's National Government, were expelled.
Consequently, from 6,500,000 votes in the 1931 elections, the LP share of the
vote increased to 8,300,000 in the 1935 general election.
114) International factors in the 1930's also had a bearing
on the shift to the left in the party. The victory of Hitler in Germany rocked
the Labour movement. Secondly, in spite of Stalinism, the rapid economic
development underway in Russia seemed to prove that an alternative system based
on a planned economy was feasible, and, most importantly, revolutionary
developments in Spain were moving towards a Civil War.
115) But, with the defeat of the working class in Spain at
the end of the 1930s, and the growing threat of war, the LP shifted back
towards the right again. When war started, not only did Labour support the war,
its right-wing leader, Clement Attlee led the LP into another National
Government and became Deputy Leader under Churchill.
 |
| Tony Blair, war criminal and Bush ally |
117) Despite this, workers again poured back towards the LP
at the end of the war, giving Labour the largest electoral victory in history
on a radical socialist programme, which led to the nationalization of 30% of
the economy and the creation of the free National Health Service.
118) It would take too much time to go into the whole
history of the post-war period, suffice to say, that once again the LP shifted
back to the right in the post-war boom of the 1950s-1970s, much like it did
later under Blair during the boom from the mid-80s to 2007. It remained in the
grip of the right-wing for decades, led by people like Frank Chapple of the
Electricians Union and Labour Deputy Leader, Dennis Healey, and there is plenty
evidence to suggest that both of them, and many others worked for the CIA and
the British secret service.
119) In the 60's and 70's, two right-wing Labour governments
under Wilson and Callaghan went into a political alliance with the Liberals
(the Lib-Lab pact) and carried out a massive series of attacks on the working
class with policies of cuts, wage restraint and anti-TU laws. This coupled with
the world economic recession of 1974 led to a huge strike wave called the
“Winter of Discontent.” Callaghan brought in the army to run emergency services
during the firemens' dispute, and made plans to call a state of emergency
involving the mobilization of 13,000 troops to break the lorry drives' strike.
120) As a result of this betrayal by the right-wing Labour
leaders and a world economic crisis in 1974 similar to 2007, the LP shifted to
the left again. International political factors also played an important
role. A left-wing wave had been sweeping
across the world beginning with the revolution in France in 1968, the uprising
in Czechoslovakia and the huge anti-war movement in the US. In Southern Europe,
the last dictatorships fell under the revolutionary pressure of the
masses.
121) Consequently, after 25 years of right-wing domination,
a huge new left-wing developed in the LP in the 1970s and 1980s. A whole new
layer of left activists from among youth and workers poured into the LP. Around
that time, Tony Benn ran for Deputy Leader of the LP and narrowly lost the vote
by a margin of only 1%.
122) The ensuing battle between the left and right in the
Labour Party lasted 20 years, until changes in the objective situation turned
the tide against the left again, empowering the right-wing to take back
control. The defeat of the miners' strike in 1986 (in some ways similar to how
the defeat of the 1926 General Strike helped MacDonald) and the beginnings of
the new economic boom, (similar to the post-war boom), plus the collapse of
Stalinism all strengthened the right-wing in the Labour Party once again. The
subsequent witch hunts against the left and Militant, then prepared the ground
for Blair to carry out a far-reaching counter-revolution inside the LP and
another 25 years of right-wing control followed – until now when finally the
tide has turned back in favor of the left again.
123) Looking back across the history of the Labour Party, it
is clear to see that Labour has constantly swung left and right under the
influence of developments at home and abroad. To cite Blair's policies as a
unique historical turning point, never before seen in Labour's history looks
pretty feeble when set against the treachery of previous Labour leaders.
124) The combination of the betrayals of right-wing Labour
governments, economic crisis and international events have always created the
conditions for a swing back to the left in the LP, while, on the other hand
economic boom, a lull in the class struggle and reactionary developments abroad
have always provided the backdrop to swings to the right. Now, the combination
of favorable objective factors has laid the basis for the shift left in the
Labour Party again, with the election of Corbyn and the massive influx of youth
and workers trying again to transform the LP into a real, mass socialist party.
125) Even if the right is able to launch a successful
counter attack against the left, it won't matter. The shift to the left won't
come in one single wave, but in multiple surges. There will be victories and
defeats for the left as the class struggle ebbs and flows. There could even be
a left split-away similar to the ILP in the past and some on the left expect
this to come soon, when the right-wing begins a counter-offensive.
126) Such a development is not ruled out, but it wouldn't be
anywhere near the size of the ILP in the 30s and like the ILP it would rapidly
disappear off the political map. Even if Corbyn led it, it would end up in the
wilderness. But it is unlikely he would. Corbyn is probably too shrewd for that
and he understands what has been happening on the left outside the party. The
right-wing probably wouldn't be able to expel him, and he has been in the LP
for the long haul and will probably continue to do so. Any break away without
such a figurehead would be even more likely to sink like a stone.
127) Some in the left outside the LP hold out the
perspective that the new left movement around Corbyn is really “a new
independent workers' party in the process of formation.” This is simply
rubbish. In the event of mass expulsions the majority of new activists would
probably become demoralized and drop into inactivity, with only a handful
joining the small left groups.
128) However, the objective conditions for the right-wing
are not favorable. Any victory it has over the left would be a pyrrhic and
temporary one. Reasserting an iron grip over the LP could only be done if there
was a long period of economic boom, capitalist stabilization and a downturn in
the class struggle. That looks highly unlikely.
129) The current recovery is very shaky and shows signs of
slowing down. It could quite quickly be replaced by a new recession. It appears
that the capitalists don't have any more economic cards up their sleeves.
Unless, they are able to conjure up some magical new strategy, we are in for a
protracted period of economic and social instability. This will be reflected
inside the Labour Party with a long period of right/left battles pushing the
left-wing further and further towards the ideas of revolutionary socialism. The
political manifestation of the class struggle is now taking place inside the
Labour Party at this moment. This is exactly the right time for socialists, who
are now outside the LP, to drop their sectarian stance and join the party.
129) Another complex manifestation of the radicalization in society and the shift to the left in general, has been the rise of nationalist, independence movements in Catalonia and Scotland, each with a strong left component. These are, by far, not the only nationalist movements in Europe, but, for the moment, they are the most significant ones.
PART 3
THE NEW LEFT AND THE NATIONALIST
MOVEMENTS IN SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA
129) Another complex manifestation of the radicalization in society and the shift to the left in general, has been the rise of nationalist, independence movements in Catalonia and Scotland, each with a strong left component. These are, by far, not the only nationalist movements in Europe, but, for the moment, they are the most significant ones.
130) The combination of the economic crisis, the betrayal of
the leaders of the traditional workers' parties and historical animosity
between the Scots and the English, and between the Catalans and the Castilian
ruling class in Spain, has meant that many youth and radicalized sections of
the middle class, together with many workers have turned towards secessionist
movements to express their anger and in the hope that independence could be a
way out of the crisis.
131) In both regions, there have been recent votes on
independence, both of which were lost, but in which the separatist votes were
very high. In 2014 in Scotland, 44% voted in favour and 55% against
independence. In 2015 in Catalonia – where for constitutional reasons it took
the form of regional elections – it was closer, with the pro-independence
parties winning a majority of seats and 48% of the vote, just short of the 50%
majority needed to declare victory. However, like the shift to the left in
general, there are both similarities in the movements in Scotland and Catalonia
and a great deal of differences as well.
 |
| SNP First Minister Nicola Sturgeon at 2015 conference |
Scotland
132) In Scotland, the left nature of the independence
movement has been much clearer than in Catalonia. Like the rest of the UK,
Scotland hasn't experienced an independent left movement such as Podemos or
SYRIZA for historical and cultural reasons. Instead the new left movement has
manifested itself in support for the Scottish National Party (SNP), which is
a left-nationalist party, that stands for secession and campaigns on a
left-reformist programme of defending jobs and services. In its programme it states
that the SNP fights for a, “real alternative to the pain of austerity, an end
to unfair policies like the Bedroom Tax, a higher minimum wage and protection
for our NHS and vital public services.”
133) Traditionally SNP support came from among the middle
classes and the SNP has always been a petty bourgeois center party. But to
stand any chance of taking power and winning a yes vote in a referendum, it had
no choice but to move to the left. This was also facilitated by the shift to
the right in the Labour Party and the absence of an autonomous, left movement
like Podemos or SYRIZA, which left a vacuum on the left, which the SNP could
fill. As a result, there has been a tendency to paint the independence movement
as a working class movement. However, while there is no doubt that a large
number of workers did vote for independence, it was not necessarily a
majority.
134) Many workers in Scotland were not convinced of the
economic benefits of breaking away from the United Kingdom, and were afraid
that it could lead to a loss of jobs and a fall in living standards. Workers
understand that the Scottish economy is intrinsically linked with the national
and international economy. They also know that the majority of the Scottish
economy is controlled by the British ruling class, rather than by a Scottish
bourgeoisie.
135) More than 70% of Scotland’s total economic output is controlled by non-Scottish-owned firms
and 83% of enterprises employing 250 or
more people are owned by non-Scottish companies. Furthermore, virtually the
whole of the North Sea oil and gas production is owned by foreign firms, and
the top 90 banks and finance companies operating in Scotland are registered
outside the country, with their profits going directly back to England or abroad.
136) Many Scottish workers feared that with the
complications and instability which independence could bring, it might lead to
many of these companies leaving Scotland or reducing their investments.
Secondly, many Scottish workers feared that independence would divide them from
other workers in Britain employed by those companies. They know that the
capitalist class tries to play one group of workers off against another in
different countries, and that this can lead to a reduction in wages and less
job security. Moreover, organizing joint industrial action across international
borders is a very difficult thing and they feared that if Scottish trade unions
broke away from the all-British union structures, this would weaken solidarity
with other British workers and undermine their ability to defend themselves
against the bosses.
137) Until now, the British Labour Party has always been the
traditional party of the Scottish working class., indeed Scottish workers
played a key role in creating it. Scotland has long been considered a
rock-solid bastion of the Labour Party, returning an overwhelming number of
Labour MPs to Parliament. But in the 2015 UK national election, the Labour
Party suffered a humiliating, PASOK-scale defeat in Scotland, and its catastrophe
decline there has severely undermined its ability to form a future national
government.
138) The Scottish referendum took place 8 months before the
UK general election in 2015, and while many workers had voted against
independence, when it came to the general election, they voted overwhelming for
the SNP, mercilessly punishing Labour, not only for its betrayal of the British
working class in general, but for the chauvinistic, class collaborationist
position it put forward in the run up to the referendum. Labour had campaigned
against independence, in alliance with the right-wing Conservative (Tory)
government, which was carrying out draconian attacks on the working class in
Scotland.
139) The Tories are largely despised in Scotland. They are
seen by Scottish workers as the representatives of the English ruling class
responsible for the suppression and exploitation of the Scottish people.
Indeed, such is the hatred for the Conservative party that they have never
succeeded in getting anymore than a handful of MPs elected from Scotland.
140) As a result of its alliance with the Tories in the
independence campaign and its failure to present any class-based
arguments. If they had clearly supported
the right of Scottish people to independence, but argued for the maximum unity
of the working class and offered the perspective of a future federation of
independent British states of Scotland, England and Wales, they would have
caught the year of many Scottish workers. But, instead, Labour became seen as
just another representatives of the oppressive English ruling class, and so
although many workers voted no to independence in 2014, they mercilessly
punished Labour in the 2015 national, general election. While the LP's overall
vote in the UK also fell dramatically at a national from 40% to 30%, in
Scotland its vote plunged from 40% to 24%, loosing 40 of its 41 MPs. SNP
support, on the other hand, rocketed from 20% to 50% of the vote.
141) However, despite their stupendous victory in the
general election, the austerity policies now being carried out by the SNP in
the Scottish Parliament and city councils will erode their support. They are
cutting millions of pounds from spending on public services and thousands of
jobs are being lost. The SNP is betraying the working class and dumping its
left programme in practice. It is shifting to the right, and as it increasing
fails to deliver promised reforms and continues with its austerity measures,
Scottish workers will begin to become disillusioned with it. It will also become
clearer to Scottish workers, who voted for independence, that there cannot be a
solution to their problems on the basis of an independent capitalist Scotland,
and that there needs to be solutions on a national and international level.
Then, there will be great opportunity to gather support for socialist ideas
based on a Socialist Federation of Britain, and a European Socialist Union.
142) It is not clear whether the LP has been permanently
destroyed in Scotland. It still commands a quarter of the vote, but because of
the first-passed-the-post, constituency-based voting system – rather than
proportional representation like other countries – they have not returned MPs
corresponding to the size of the vote. An overall vote of 20% does show that
the LP still has some base in Scotland. With the betrayals of the SNP, it is
possible that it could recover, but to what degree is unsure.
143) Historical and cultural factors suggest that the shift
to the left in Scotland will still probably find its main expression inside the
traditional parties of the SNP and Labour Party, rather than through the
development of some autonomous SYRIZA/Podemos-style movement. The victory
of Jeremy Corbyn as British Labour Party
leader and the emergence of a more radical, left-wing British Labour Party
could also attract back some disillusioned workers, who voted for the SNP. The Scottish Labour Party (Scottish wing of
UK LP) really has nowhere to go but left. The reformist nature of the SNP and
the betrayals of the right-wing Labour leaders means there is no center ground
for them. Indications of such a shift to the left came at the Scottish LP
conference in 2015, when it voted to scrap the Trident missile programme, based
in Scotland.
144) However, there are other possible variants. It could
also be possible in the future that a more socialist left-wing develops within
the SNP, in opposition to its shift to the right, and that eventually a split
takes place in in its ranks, leading to the creation of a new more radical,
left-wing nationalist party. Furthermore, if the right-wing manage to suppress
the new left in the British Labour Party, it couldn't be entirely ruled out
that the Scottish Labour Party would shift further to the left and even break
away from the national party, creating an independent, left-wing Scottish
Labour Party – which might then enter a coalition with a new break away,
left-wing Scottish nationalist party.
145) How things develop also depends a lot on the economic
situation. Increased growth could see a decline in the nationalist movement,
there are even indications that a section of SNP voters have actually turned
back to the Tories. Despite considerable poverty in de-industrialized areas,
other areas of Scotland are relatively prosperous. The Scottish capital,
Edinburgh, for has example, has the best living standards of any city in
Britain, with the highest wages, low unemployment and the lowest costs of
living than anywhere else.
146) But another major world crisis could put independence
back on the agenda, as well as pushing society further to the left in general.
However, the correlation between the economy and the so-called “National
Question” isn't always simple and straightforward. There are many other
political factors and unforeseeable factors which can also change the direction
that events take.
Brief Concluding Remarks on the Discussion Paper--The New Left in Europe
Stephen
Morgan
180) After 25 years, during which society was
dominated by capitalist ideology, the tide has finally turned back towards the
left. The apathetic and apolitical generation of youngsters from the pre-2007
boom, have now been replaced by a new left-leaning generation of
anti-capitalist youth. Working people formally swept up in the false wealth of
the property boom and unlimited credit, have swung back towards class struggle,
under the onslaught on living standards and austerity measures.
181) This new wave of radicalized
youth and more combatant workers have been the driving force behind the rise of
the New Left. Because the old traditional workers' organizations lagged behind
these changes in consciousness, the shift to the left in society found its
expression in the growth of groups left groups like Podemos, SYRIZA, Die Linke
and Front de Gauche, and, in Britain, in the left-wing surge behind Jeremy
Corbyn in the LP.
182) However, following decades,
when class consciousness and political understanding was thrown back, the
re-awakening of the working class is only at its beginning. Working people have
not yet become fully conscious of their role in society as a class and of the
need to transform society along socialist lines. This lack of clarity has found
its expression in the fuzziness and limitations of the political programmes of
the new left formations, compounded by their largely middle class composition
and leadership.
183) Despite their stinging
criticisms of capitalism, the new left groups lack any theoretical clarity or
clear socialist ideology. This leaves them rudderless in the face of changing
events, and opens them up to bourgeois influences, which encourage a watering
down of their programmes and more and more opportunistic policies. Moreover, not
having been thrown up directly by the workers' organizations, they lack the
sort of social ballast and class roots needed to give them any permanency. Nevertheless,
the development of the New Left represents a quantum shift in class politics. But,
at the same time, it is only harbinger of many surges to the left in the
future.
184) There are too many
unforeseeable variables to say definitively what the future of these new left
formations will be. At the moment, support for the new left groups seems to
have peaked, and even appears to be declining in some countries. If the economy
continues to improve, and they shift further to the right, their vote could
fall back below 5%, and some groups might even break up and disappear
altogether.
185) On the other hand, the weak
recovery in the world economy and the possibility of a new recession, combined
with continuing austerity measures and right-wing policies of the traditional
socialist parties, could allow them to maintain a certain level of support. A
severe economic downturn could breath new life into them. New left splits in
some traditional workers' parties could also occur. But, that might be
tempered, if a new crisis also shifts the old socialist parties to the left.
186) What is sure is that this
isn't going to be one smooth, meteoric surge towards a new mass socialist
movement, but process which will more likely to zigzags in contradictory ways.
As we have already seen the development of the New Left hasn't been uniform or synchronized internationally, but has
taken on – and will continue to take on – many different forms, in different
countries, at different times.
187) While there will be
similarities and overlapping tendencies in how the left develops
internationally, it is likely that new left movements in the future will
manifest themselves in even more unique ways. However, at the same time,
traditional paths for left-wing developments, through the old socialist
parties, may re-arise in tandem with entirely new formations. Some of outlines of
these processes may be foreseeable, while others cannot be predicted, and may
appear suddenly from unexpected sources and in unpredictable places. Sudden and
profound changes in class consciousness and political understanding, such as in
Greece, can quickly throw up new mass left-wing movements.
188) If we look back on history, every
single movement to the left since the beginning of the workers' movement has taken
on unique and quite different features – Chartism in Britain in the first half
of the 19th century; the communards of Paris in 1871; the 1st
International; the creation of mass trade unions and the mass socialist parties
at the end of the 19th century; mass anarchist movements in Southern
Europe; the Communist parties in the 1920s, Stalinist societies; the mass
left-wings in the traditional parties of the working class and their
split-ways; and in the post-war period the overthrow of capitalism in the
underdeveloped world by guerrilla armies and left-wing military coups. We also
saw the mass Anti-Vietnam War protests and the Black Panthers in the US in the
1960s-70s, as well as other manifestations of left-wing currents in
organizations, like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the new phenomenon
of the Green parties. Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, we
have already witnessed a dizzying kaleidoscope of left-wing currents not seen
before in history.
189) As the economy rises and falls
and the class struggle ebbs and flows, there will be victories and defeats, and
advances and retreats for the working class and the left. There is no way of
jumping over this process, because it is only through assimilating the lessons
of triumphs and setbacks that new layers of workers and youth can draw the
right conclusions about the need for revolution and the strategy, form and
content of a socialist programme which can achieve that.
190) Therefore, socialists cannot
afford to be dogmatic and schematic in their approach to building a new
socialist movement. It may be possible to take a fixed position on a
theoretical question or a political issue, but it would be disastrous to take a
rigid and categorical standpoint on any unfolding and unfinished process. In
particular, you can't simply impose a theory about how things will develop in
one country onto another. That sort of blinkered and mechanical thinking will
shipwreck any group or organization.
191) Consequently, revolutionaries
need to be open-minded when it comes to analyzing events or anticipating future
developments. Organizationally, they will have to be original and inventive in
the ways they intervene in new left-wing currents and the labour movement in
general. And they will need to find fresh and imaginative ways to put their ideas
across and win support for a socialist programme.
2 comments:
Hi, an interesting analysis here that I am sorry I have only just found. However what worries me is that in two of the situations you analyse (France and Spain) and another one (Portugal)you leave out the absolutely essential and indispensable role played by organisations linked to the Fourth International. Perhaps you have "disappeared" some major groups or individuals from the processes discussed is because of your background in the CWI as it can't be from ignorance. At least in the case of Portugal you refer to the Bloco de Esquerda as having originated in some unnamed Trotskyists although to be completely honest you should acknowledge that it was the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR by it's initials in Portuguese) that formed the Bloco along with the ex-Maoist UDP and Politica XXI. Similarly I do not understand how you can talk about the situation on the far left in France without referring to the role played by the Fourth International's New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) or it's predecessor the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) and by one reference to Lutte Ouvriere. I am not questioning the major and many disagreements anyone may have with these organisations. Open and free discussion is the only way that we can build alternatives to capitalism. This cannot be done if you pretend that these organisations do not exist.
Your excision of the comrades of the Anticapitalistas, previously the Anticapitalist Left (IA) the section of the Fourth International in the Spanish state, is even more absurd given that Podemos would not even exist without their leadership a fact widely understood and acknowledged except here. Again, many disagreements with the politics of and the role played by the Anticapitalistas in Podemos are possible, but to allow these disagreements to erase these comrades from any attempt to draw a serious balance sheet of these processes seem to me to be either a case of sour grapes at best or the sort of stalinist sectarianism that remain a legacy of many left organisations -- even those claiming continuity with Trotsky's ideas. This also means that neither yourself nor your readers will be able to judge the issues critically as your prejudices take precedence over principled politics.
David I just saw your comment now. My name is Sean O'Torain and along with Richard I started the Facts For Working People Blog. I was in the CWI for 25 years, 20 of those on its IEC and 10 on its IS and over 20 as a fulltimer. I am interested in what you write and would like to discuss this more with you. I recognize that the CWI and I myself were sectarian in relation to other left groups. This is difference from being sectarian in relation to the working class. What led me to join the CWI was that it had an orientation to the working class and I found that the other left groups did not have this orientation. Depending on how the wind was blowing they were either orientating to student movements, guerrilla groups etc. and then would on occasion veer back to the working class. I and the other few Comrades from FFWP are breaking from left sectarianism. The article you comment on was incorrect in not mentioning the role of the left groups in the rise of the left parties. The Comrade who wrote this article is no longer active due to illness or I am sure he would respond. One of the things we have struggled with is recognizing openly our own mistakes. I recognize this mistake in this article. We are trying now to struggle against left sectarianism, both in our own pasts and the left sectarianism that still is very prevalent in the left groups and very damaging to the workers movement. We are not hostile to other left groups. We are hostile to left sectarianism wherever we meet this, either in our own past or present or in other left groups. We seek to work together with forces in other left groups against sectarianism. But we have a proviso in this. For it to have any chance of success and to justify the use of our tiny resources we pretty much confine our discussions and work against left sectarianism to those who are prepared to openly own up to and face up to and draw lessons from their own left sectarianism. Prepared to deal with why revolutionary socialism has not been able to put down mass toots in the working class and their and our role in this failure. You are correct and we openly accept that the articles on the rise of the left in Europe should have dealt with the role of the left groups in Europe, the positive and negative roles they played and the roles they are likely to play. I am interested in discussing more with you on this issue. I hope you check this and get this comment. It would probably be better to discuss by email. My email is loughfinn@aol.com. I am originally from Ireland but now live in Chicago. Comradely, Sean.
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